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PREFACE 
T.his study takes a br.1:ef' l@@k at a negle~ted but nevertheless im= 
port.ant a.rsa @f diploma.@y between the 'fl.ll'S o The @@ntr~Vfffsy @Ver the SU.JI> 
Basin was b<illm in the p.ssi@u g•eat~ af'~l- W@~ld ~:::I§) but h.7 rela= 
t1:vely d@:tmant f@:f s4lJWe thi~m yea&:r.''So At the a@~essi@n @f Rltlez;,9 how.,.. 
ever, the Baar situtl@n be®ame @ri..ti@al.9 eve~ tw the P®int @f tmi•~ng 
war :t:n. 1934 'bet~en FH.n@e and ~o Tw :inteimlepend~t pNii'blem.s ude 
up the Saar questi@ru the si t'jja:ti@n w.lthin the Saar ~:m:ting in the 
19:35 plebis©litej) and the dipl<m.a.ti@ 'tilHnglei beitwen ~~® md Gemanyo 
Seve:Nl. monographs have dealt with the f'i?>st ~blem but tbei ss@@nd area 
has been largely ignOMo TM:ffllf'@Nti it has been 'lf'l9' :1ntenti@n t@ outline 
the whole qMJ.esticn with the st:JE>®ss 11.':»n the f@:feign :p®lil@y @f F.f>m@eo The 
pl"Oblems 'l»:f' S@'U'Cl!EilS inml.ediatal,.y NimiEI~ thilS appr®l&@h diffl~to ~ 
tensive usie ct tl\ie !!! I!.t\t .T!m!! was @ombined w1 th th.e available m.81101:ris 
of several F?>emh 1151ffi@ials ad~ tn Fren@h peri@tiodsi in additi@n, the 
~t!, l?!f:J.1:M..!,'.ft.~D,!. @f the tJMllibS:f @f ~piiti$S arAd 4!!, :rem;u._ of Pari.S RN 
at han.do othe~ FNln@h jMl~~ @wld r».@t b(!l) @b~d9 am ~nl.y a min:btmm 
of F.fenoh tiplmne.ti@ oo:Pt>espe>nd~me •is available f'~m Bfitish F@:«>eign · 
Of'f'iGe :publi@ati@nso M@ist ~~ de,ffilffients in this a~ lffl:f@ wtaJ.17 :11,~ 
;.;:·. 
accessibleo Thus" the sw:ey- hR'®ln ~e2m::mteti is @.fm<el@essit,, imom.plete, 
mt will, I hope, serve as a basia :f@r la.tell' :i:.oese&Hho It is a tasciim.ting 
pel"'l~d and eine that sh<W.ld l~ad t@ deepin> l.fflde~standi:ng ~t Hitler0s to:re>eign 
poliq m@tives in a ci!'>i.ti@.al em<> 
A@kncwlGd~nts f@r this stll!.d;r U® ll'ffllll~~Usa Special gRtitude goes 
t@ 11-o ibrlel" Lo Ddghtj his gt1i~e s~tim~s has been llMessari.1y f1Bl 
iil 
w,t al.ways patiento Dt'o IIT©w. L~:thei?'Sj :lm@'IR Qifllptitl"'tment head iil.t the um.,, 
ve:rsity c:r T~ledc 11 first suggested t~ generM u»pic <@f the Saari Ba.sino 
l!lr>o Doughs D<> · Hal&, Jro 11 . dev~ed ~ unsQ.fish h~s to impJ:'@Ve MY' 
W?'ko ~o Alfred Levin and nt;,o Ao Mo C!l~p@Vat desei:f'Ve thanks f'(/)?' thm 
incisive ©riticisns and helpful suggesti®Mo And the lib~ swr at 
Oklahoma . state Umver:isi ty has been a tr>emend@Us help by ~wing ma ... 
teaals fo:f meo Ab@ve all.ii m:r wife desewe~ tllJOMmemati@n · f'@1t' her f'@:t'\,,, 
bea.?'~il:i with me a:nd for he;,p @onstant eu@u:,iagemerit and dd.; never did 
she flag in her determina:tt~n and i:ndl,i.1$t:ey' o 
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one of the.m@st familia~ of hist@l"i~al paradoxes has been the Tl'>eaty 
ot Versailleso Forged almost lite~al.17 as a m.eohanism fer pea@e and 
hailed idealistically as a basis for intemati@Ml. cioopera.ti@n,.it instead 
operated to f'om.ent 11.a.ticnalism and event one may argue, wa:rio The pl"C.., 
'Visions of' Ve:r>sa:Ules @omwning the Rbinliland we:fe n@ more w:rkable than 
various othe:ri p:ricpc»sals siMfl Char'leugne0s deatho Alsace ... Ler:t>ai:n.e, in 
d:lspllte sine1e the rd.nth eie?Atu:ey- and a maj@Jll fa.@te»r leading tq,,, ~rld war 
I, Nmd.ned an ~es~lved p:wblem attEir 19190 The Saar Basin likewise 
persisted as a disp11ted a~ea and late~ became a stepping=stone tc Ge~ 
aggressiono1 The de~isic:ms made at the Paris Pea@e C@nf'e~e gave ziise 
to th, SU.:ri ffl.>ntNVGHY' whi@h ©Ulmina.ted in the Saar plebis@ite ct 19:3So 
From that moment the Hi tle:l"ia.n die was @a.st o The :r2esul:t.s cf' the plebi~ 
so:ite, which retumed the Sa.arllll'ld t@ Ge~, seem to ~ve given Hitler 
a :meaw.re of <llonfidencie, and may ha.ve 11:t>ged him into the vent'Uf'es he 
late:ri risked and wno Th& Sa.al> tri.umph was !>elatively unehalle:nged by,. 
France and g~a:tly s~:ngthenied thei Nazi }lYQ)Si ti@n b@th if& Ge:maey an.a 
Eu:rcpe by' adding a people a.nd a:Nta t© th® Third Reioho This study will 
shew the fa.et.ors whi@h led to Bit1eres f'il"st vietoey in the Saar ple~ ... 
seite ®~ a victol".Y' gained ~ugh negotiation ~ather than wa:r>o 
1 
2 
The 1919 Paris n~gotiations to:t> peace saw tbe im.tial mel'gence er 
the Saar questicn6 Althoogh :it-.~ not the most pressing question at the 
Conf'erenoe, the controversy surrw.nding the di.sposition of' the Saar, 
principally betwei&n Georges Clemenceau and W©odrow Wilsont almost dis~ 
rupted that meeting., As ea:rily as Feb:ruaey- 91 1917, Frame had sought a 
tree hand in the Rhineland, iMluding the Saar Basin., A secret treaty 
with Russia. at that time anti@ipated F?>emh annexation of the "entire 
coal district of the SU.r Valley," and the @reation of an independent 
2 buffer state in the Rhinelando Hertd.n may be f'ffl.Uld an expression of' the 
primary aim 0;f French diplo~elY between the wars and the introduction of 
the concept cf "wunt,.," More specialized than its English equi:valen~9 
seourit, came 'W mean the strengthening of the Fren©h political. and eeo.,,, 
nomic position v.is""~""v.1s Gemanyo3 Sin©e Ge~ was potentially superior 
both in manpower and in war p:f'@du@tioin, .the French feared a.n,C)ther invasion 
by her old roe; hence the demand tor dardlitarization and repa:rationso 
The cessic:»n of the Saar w Frame would p:N>mcte both objectives., In 
Gema.n han~ the tern tory coold serve .as a l'OUte of invasion; this route . 
must be closedo Moreover, deprivation cf Saar ieeal wcald limit German in.., 
dustrial capacity as it would strengthen the Freneih1, and.the Saar Cl()Jal re.., 
oeived by France could aiso be termed reparation in kind, a form of repa.., 
Mtion to whicll Wilson would acquiesceo4 
2R.a.y stannard Baker, _W,odrow Wilson SS World. .~ttlemem:, (Garden 
City, No Yo, 1923), I, 57®58o . 
3In the opinion ot Ray stannard Bakerf "the basic idea ot CJ:rippling 
Germany in an e<lionomic sensejl as a guarantee of Fremh security, lay deep. 
und.emeath the struggle for the permanent CJontrol of the ooal of' the Saar, 
the permanent C!liontrol of the Rhine f'rontie:..,\j) and the weakening of Gersiiany 
in the Silesia.n dis·t:dots., 89 ~J!2n, !!!£ lfp.J1.!: SetP.S!Et1l1• I, 363.,,,3640 
4Andr, Tardieu, The Truth About the ~ea.tf. (Indianapolis, cQ 1921). p; 
263; Baker, Wilson and'woMd Sem;;ient;' II!il :1 o 
~ •-.~• •••........, ~ao-,a,u;w O:WP 
the Peacie Conf'er~nc:eo The :fa©t tha:t the p:rin~ir:ial ~oa:JL,.,,,p~duletlng region 
of FN.neie had be11n devastated by the wlt,hdr>aw.:1:ng Ge~n t:f\Otirps · p?Ovided 
the :f'lrst basis to:r t:,hese olaimso As Fran~e n~mally impe:r'ted l:lOal aey ... 
way, she was t:rem.end~sl;y hll:i.rt by tb.11 a~ fwl.t ent,U.1,@d te an ind;•m:tt ... 
oatic::i:n tor. the lcnsso Seoondly, Fr&nCJe ha.d. bean in cion'tNl ©llf' tbei Saar 
until 1815, whe:n :it, was a:rmexed by ~ssia., Aetually, Ge:mt1tn;r and F.r>ance 
had disputed the tewitc:ey f'o~ ij&ntu.cl.ea and both ola:tmed it b:Y' right., 
At any ;r,ate, the sc ... 10Jal.led 9"1814 f~nti.er," the fa~hest F'l'>en~h peneoo 
t'.flat!.on ot the region, oomp~sed oi:nly a small pa:ll't ct that @(llal,.,,.pr,odt,u11ing 
area France new eilaimed and imludad t,he least important, mine~ o; Yet 
~,U'X)e stN:ngl;y @ppcsed dividing the tem tciey on the basis @f 18140 She 
wanted all the @calo Thu.a the:re developed a tw,..prli;iJnged cl~.inu that the 
FrQnch should have poli t,i@al @o:!lntriol eve,:, that pa:t"t cf the ~,H1,'.lr;l "d. thin 
the 1814 beundaey with a. separiate admimst:fation ov~:f the rem,dnde:1?'1 and 
·that theys ahould ha:ve efJlc:nmrdo convcl, of the wbeleo Elabc~~:t,~ a~e)nts 
were addu~ed in suppo~t. @:!' this a~a:ngement, f1:ristaug1est~rdl by PN:f"essori 
I.n@1@n Gallo1s and the Comit, d0Etudeso6 Wilsen 'Wffl.1ld a~cept ~1 valid 
on:J.r th~ ~ench a:t"gwaent that tbey wer,e anti tled to.·. the Sati.11 ~ef11 as :reps ... 
M t!ons o · Uoyd Gecz;ige, on the. ether hand, was ready> to a~~· tJ&l any pro!» . 
F:fen~h arrangement which did not @Nate a new Alsa.i:us...,,Loriraineo 
alemenceau struggled en, sometimes bitteril;v, in pu:z,,suit 
5Tardieu 11 ~ ~\ ~b,t, Xllm, PPo 2;6.,,,2;7, 2SOo 
6Ibid,,, Po 262., The Com:1:t, ae1tt:,udes wa1 oompcsfjd of aY4nent French 
achclars t,o coordinate p~m:ey' gcveMmlental studies p:r>eparato:ey- to the 
French peaGe d.emands., Headed by, the hist@rian ~est ta.visse 11 it collected 
and Cfl1tid.zed the geogRphi@ali etJ:i:ioal. 91 hi11tcrieial, and poli:M.Gal 
taeto:r10 Gallois was an homred Umvei:risity ct Pal"'.ts gecpaphero 
4 
.economic arid political ~ontN»l or the area with a plebis~ite to be held 
af't,er fifteen years er this arN.ngemento France felt that althngh the · 
. . . ' ( 
Saar was ba.sicall;y French,, it wuld take time to overeome 100 ;years of' 
Prussian influemeo The plebiseite idea was in answer to Wilson's re.,., 
·-· 
f'us~ to allow annexation without a Saar wtea In his reply ot' f!K.a.rch 31, 
Wilson accepted the idea of French ownership of the mines hut ?"ejected 
tbe 1814 frontier lfll:t' th~ <:l:r>eation c;,f ani,ndepe~ent statec7 ByA;prll, a, 
Lloyd George was in virtual support (»f the Fremh p@Si tiono __ Wilson wuld 
. . . 
z_i~t give in c>n his opposition~ FJ.<>emh political co~t.I"Ol o:t the Saar, 
but sugg~sted instead a Fran@~Gema.11 ar}?itnt,ion comm!~sion t@ d~.W!_th 
,. 
p<,li tie1l?.,,,ecom:mie c©n.fliets o - Clemenceau, in his note (!)f April 9, indi ... 
e~ted_ he 1ffiluld a~cept Lloyd GeorgeGs ciompwm!se 1,roposal @f Leaga.E!I of 
Na,t:i,~n's goverNu·rce foUowed by a plebiscite and, a _CUstools Union_ with 
Fra.n~e~8 Wilson ag:reed9 pei:rhtlps reoog:r.dz:;ng the advantages (?f mediatEU.y 
presenting the League with a weighty problem" This a~~emEllnt led directly 
-to the f'~:ng of section IV @f . Pa.rt m @f' the Versailles- Tt>e&ty """"' the 
"Saar Cl,a"1$e""9 
"as compensation .. ooandooor&paration.,"1° 
7lbido t PPo 266.,.,2710 
--- · 8:oavid tloyd George, 
1939). I 9 274,..,279; TarQieu-11.~, 
Conference (Nn Haven, 
_ ·a.tr, PP9 211=275.t1 -
- 9:eaker., ~.isgi11 9i !l,rld. §~ttl!91,~, II, 7.5; Tardieu, '11rl:lth About 
the ;rr,ea~, Po 277 o - - - -
10The. Treatt,2 ,2!. Peace, lil2,=lill (3 vols; New York, 1924), I, :,2 • 
. \ 
5 
were to be rem.Wede ~ar.ies ©if the· Saal" ~re de:limited9 the Lea~e @:f' 
Nations was named as t?U.stee, and personal rights of the Saarlmders were 
gua.ranteedo The SUr .A.rmex applied thes~ general p!"inC1iples t© specific 
eonditionso Regardb:»g the 11cessil@n and ex:ploitati@n q;f mining property," 
Frame was to exemse absolute authority, not onlY.' over the mines ;ee:r>e, 
but also ewer all plants, equipment, wrkshops, by=produ.cts, bdldings, 
c~ation, schools, hospitals, and afrY' other accessories or appendageso 
The ruue received from this am?ang~nt was w be established by a R,epa. ... 
rati@n Commission, and @redited to Germany's reparation debto hrthe:ra. 
more, nc enGUmbra.wes, such as Ge:rwm. debt, ta:f>iff's, s@cial sewrl.:ty 
claims, etco in emess e;f wmal charges would accrue to Fl-'aneeo The 
French Government would thus control f'o:midable instl"W'llents su@h as an 
economic mrea.ucraey- and supervision of xrm.ch of the Saar edu.©ational fa ... 
cilities wlth:twhich to pl"Opa..gandize fol" a favorable plebis~i teoll 
The ••government of the te:nitory of the sa.ar Basin" was to be a five.,. 
man Goveming Commissitm appointed. by the League C@UMil and ©onsisting 
of' one Frenchman, one Saa.rlander, and three others :neither French nor 
Gema.no Full administrative powers devolved upon the Commission wbichi 
though salaried by local revenues~. was responsible o:nly to the Leagueo 
The Commission "WOuld secure all Saar dccmr1ents and goverin aee©:J:'lding to 
laws in effect on November ll, 1918, with modifi@ations if net'H:11ssa.:170 In 
all areas.except these cont:rolled by Frame, the Gove:md.ng Commission of 
the League was to be supreme, even ;in interpreting the provisions of the 
Saar Annexo According to the "Saar Cla:u.se, n .French . euneney might be used 
in the distrietol2 This p:rovision together with French economic cont?Ol 
ll!bido, I,· 35-390 
l2Ibid.,, I, 40~o 
and, the later severity ©if' the Ge~ inf'lation!!J ·drtuilly asmt:il:'ea that 
the franc mulrd repla©e the m.a.rkG 
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The final @hapter C>f the Saar Annex ©©in@emed the plebis@ite, which 
was to be held fifteen years f'rom the Treatyl&s e:naetmento At this time, 
Saa?>h.nders ©()dd opt for~ (1) maintenance of th~ League regime with 
French e©Ommic t1om.trol (~~~! m!£); (2) union with_Frarwe; @:t' t3) union 
with Gemany (.m,~~P!ff! ..S~)., Significantly enough, the League Nserved 
the right to disp@Se @f the Te?'?'ltro>ry in a manner @cntraey to the dear 
©isi<m of the plebis©i te i.f it s@ chcsei al though .this ~s urilikely o 
Shoold ntta©hement be decided upon, Gemany wwl.d then be f'@roed to N= 
-
purehase the mines in gold at a prl©e fixed by thl"Se Lea~e=appoiinted ex= 
perls .. In addition, Fraree c:iould not be blooked from im,reha..sing Saar 
coal in wha:tever quantity n~ess~.,13 The plebis@:lte, then, b~ame the 
ke7 to the Saar qi.u;stitmo Gemmy protested against the ent.i:N:1 &tar 
clause of the Treaty, prima.rlly upon the g?'©unds that it viola.tea the 
prl,nedple of' salf".,,,detemination as embodied. in the F©urleen P@ints.,14 
The result was that Gema.ny could and did claim the Bur just as Fmnee 
~laimed ilsacea,Lo:t>Ni.ne after 187L., Anothel" tem tor.Lal p:NJblem was 
created between the two continental antago:nistso 
The 1."reat;y ot Versa.ill.es, by establishing the Saar Territ@ey, created 
a.n entirely new administra:tive unit f'rom the f'omer Prussian and Bavarian 
statess Containing only a.boot 730 square miles and a populatil}n @:£ a.bout 
800 1000, the Saar was the most densely inhabited a:t'ea in &U!®pe, averaging 
433 persons per square kilometersl5 Its wealth was measured almost 
---
l3!bid., , I, 44m47" 
l~er, ~!l !.l!S! ~ ~~~~~, I!, 509=510, 5130 
l5sarah Wambllugh,, ~ .§a~t, :f1ebisieiite (Cambridge, Masso,· 1940), p., 3; 
Russell, !h!. .~f.~-" pp., .1S'.,.,2o~gure51 cited are those of 1934a 
/ ,, 
1 
entirely in coal, with ilil!ther indust~es ionly @oliliplsentary «:))l" ~ubsidiaey 
to the mines o The third most im.p©rtant coaJ,.,,.:field of' Ell:rope lay ma.inly 
in the center, south, and west of the Terrlwey, as did th~ mj@ri pro"" 
portion of the population" In the small north.ea.stem poirti(l')fil lay an 
a.grieultu-ral a.Na., but the Saar remained an :impo?>ter of f'oodertuf'f'so As 
might be expected~ i:ron and steal p~ction was the Saar0s se©ond in.., 
dustry, but the inferi@:rity of Saar ©(llal fo:ir medem p:roduction techniques 
hindered the growth of this ente?"l)rlseo Compared with Ri1hr @©d, that cf 
the Saar ma.de low quality c©ke and was gcGid prin©ipall:y f'or gas ma.nu"" 
f'a.cituri:ng and for heating purposes., Yet there was an abm~©e of it, 
and Clemtmceau knew that the Saa:r> reserves were la:,:,ger than thiose of 
torr,aine.and the departments or the Nord and .Pas=dea,(;a1ais @ombined<l>16 
Within the small terirl.w17, the population was s@atteNd m~ng nume::r.o,., 
ous indastrialcitieso In 1934, only i):n,e su@h ciity, Saarb:ru(®©kell,i the 
capital a.nd econardci @~te:r @£ the Saar:; bad over lOOilOOO populati@no 
Netmkirohen had just over 40,oo~ inhabitants, and. the others were less 
than 20,000 in populationo17 
' 
Eklonomicallyt the Temtory wa.s a o@hesive unit and eomplementa?y ·t(;). 
. torraineo Light manufacturing supplemented the coal and f'e~, me'tal . in-
dustries i.n the Saarland ece,nom, q Glass making, pottery,· chemicals, . 
leatherwcrking, pa.per, and woodworking were seine or ·t.he most impo~'i.ant in,.., 
dustries .. tumng the 1920fls and l930's there &1')se new plants Tfflioh 
~' -- 4 
l6Miohael. T" Florinsk:y, Xl!, Saar st (N~ York, 19'.34), PPo .Sl"" 
52, An .Associate i.n F.a,nomics at""i$ii ,versity at ~e ·time this 
vol:ume was wr.itten, lJ't'Q Fl.ol"insky- undertook his s·tu.dy due to a peculiar 
interest in the Saar tJ:uest1on<1> His is an o.ften,,,.,qu.oted work in publications 
dealing w:i:th the Saarl,and al:though he adlti,ts his· oomlus:ions are me·t with 
disapproval f:riom :ma.ey i:iua:r•t,erso Tlris i.s becia:u.se Flcri.:nsky hclds that. 
Ge:man a.ctlons in the Saa:r wer.ie net e=esd:veo 
l7wambaugh, §JW:.1~~ Po 5o 
1:.0rraine ~ espev1:1ially ca:f't,f®l'l'." the in.5ti tuti©n 
Union~l9 
"' 
' 
the 
9 
problemo The Frencll made li.ttle physi@a.l impi:t-'tll''Wements w.i@h w'ijl,d riew 
qldre a la:rgie a:m.0t1nt of' ca.pi tal. !his la@k ot @a.pi tal investme:nt, the 
depressi@n, and Fremh p@litdcia.l, ::i.nterfeNme preGlu.ded any pN»:t:it,...,making 
b;r. the~ ~:n:!....,al.!!!~ oo.t the l!t"re:n.©1h sho~ge ot e;oal was alleviated .. 
Between 1913 and 1933, and e=luding Alsacie,.,,to?'rd.:ne, exports to France 
inereased almost 400 per ©ent; exp®r'ts tc Getmany fell by almost 350 per 
· cento 20 The ~ch ~swms Union and. the introcmct:i@in cf the m®lm stable 
franc inw the Saar aided this p:f'ocess; so did GeHW'l clependeMe @)J'l 
~heaper fuel (ligm:te), ele©trifiea.t:i@n, and the greater ef'ti<llli$11ey and. 
produ@tion @f the Rtim:'o In the i~n and steeil wries MU@lh Fren@h t:ll&pital 
replaeied the dep:redating mark., Sin©e the FNmh Govel'Dllent ©@Dtfflled 
both L@rra.be and, the Saar econcmy, it beciame cJheaper t@ ~J)©,'.t't.ore f'Nm 
Lorraine than ~ Ge~" As a rerut, by 1932 the Sau, was N@eivi:ng 
9lo'.3 per @ent of' its @~ t:r:m ~:r>Nine, @nly Oo5 per cent f~ ~?!DtUty'o2l 
Even in the d.epressi@n year ~:t 1929 j the Bur was prow.dong f'ou:ftitJen 
millicm tons of coal and was the chief supplier f@r the Fren©h steel :J.n.., 
do.str.ro T?>ade with France als@ pointed up the e@@mmic im.pG~Geof the 
Saar: by 19:30, Frame was seilling a.boot~ billion francs wl'1th o:f 
. . . 
products per year to the SU?>, and 'bllying a~t one and c_..hal:('. M.Ui10n . 
. . ,· ' ' .. · . ' .' ,,, 
in return<il In addition, it was then estimated that silcteenW.llie~ tons · 
. ··.. ' .. , . ', ,: . '.' ,·· ,. •, 
o'f easil;v obtainable coal :reserves remained in the Saaro. Fimll:,, th; 
Ccmit' des Forges, the F.Nnoh steel t:ust, had. perhaps 500,000 :tN.nos .in,., 
vested there, &'l'1d th:h poweri'Ul o:rganiza.t:ton demanded that its inv·estaent 
be protected ... 2.2 
-.11wwww 
201''1..o~insky, §.!.!£. §~ru.~.fl pQ 640 
2llb1.do, pQ 70,, 
22B!I. York Ilme@,51 November a, l.929, P~ ll, and Jul;v 6, 1930, Po llo 
.......... ~ .. --:-:·· 
1815., 
©fti©es in C.erman ci t:tes su.cih as F.ssen ©l" Bo!Qlhumo othet" o~arriza:tions 
so~:lal, sport~ et©" = were l:ik~dse tied to the Reieh, at least until 
was Catholi©ism, and its bish©ps resided. in 11rler (Prussia) and Speyer 
(Bavaisia.)., The Protestants, about ©ne=fOU!°th of the ti@u.1 population, 
it·e©ei ved their di1?etition :f'r©m the Evangelieal. Chu:roh of the !thine 
were :for the m©st fi£lil"t the pl"ogeny ())f a.n immigration fNm tw to five 
©entult.'"ies ©,ld and were thoroughly Gemanizedo 24 
10 
When the 11:reaty of Versailles be©ame effective on Janu.aey 10, 1920;, 
©1ne of the tea.gue Countiil"s first duties was to set up a {](i)Ve:il:>ning Com"" 
n-dssion for t..l\e Saal''<, Vi11::rwr Ra.ult was appointed the Fren©h ©©,'ffil'ldssionerj 
the ©~issiono 0£ these9 only von Bo©h and Wa.ugh were :neither pro=Freneh 
nor ant:i=Geman9 a fa.et whi©h gave rlse to too Glaim. by Ge?"maliY' and the 
Saar that the League and its Ccmimission were but tools of ~n©h poli©Yo 
23C;lemencea:u had argi1ed that there were 150,000 Frenchmen in the 
Saar, and it.,, 1.m..s only just that they be Ntumed to Fmneeo Tardieu, 
~~~~' po265o 
ll 
l:iaS heightened. b:, the ehoi<ee ot '.Rau.lt as chairman., 25 Al.though the 
G@veming C@mission made the Saar a politi@ally autonomous ur.dt and., es.., 
pe@ially in the late twenties, conscientiously strove to deal ·justly with 
. . 
the p?Oblemi their &.())t.ions were continually attaciked ff'Om beth Gem.any 
and. the Saar~ In economic wetl .... being and prosperity, in political liber= 
ty and se('Jurity, the Sau>landers were usually better ott :in these p~ 
Hitler days than their counterparl.s in . the Weimar Republic., 26 Yet tw 
labor stnkes, both p(l)litically inspired:il ?11&l"NX1. this ~ent in 
inter:natic:nal gc»Vernmento 
The first strike, coming in August, 1920, was apparently tti..:reGted 
against the mmber or foreign. officials em.ployed by the League adminis"" 
tration in the Saar., This labor casis coimid.ed with the dismptive 
railroad stl'd.ke in the Ruhr and the ,Ru.ssian threat against P®land, am 
was therefoN probably extemally inspired.~ not a specific maniresta."" 
tion ot Saarlander opposition to the Leagueo The pretext fc:p·t.he Saar 
trouble was the hiring or 6000 of the 12,ooe Leag11e ofi"ieials b>om out.,; 
side the existing Saar bureaucracy, th~gh.only sev~y..fl.ve·ot the new 
employees were non..,Qerman in natioMJ.ityo As the strike was· general, 
. ' 
martial law was deol,a:red and Fftncb :troops o~ntt!Jd t$1sp<>~tion t~ , 
cili ties;. no?mAl proeef3U~s ~~•ed att~r o.nlt J:~ij~ ~ts 0 21,: ; . . . . . , .. 
the second labor walk=OUt was somewhat lllO:r>e • Se,Y~N and was 8.l!l ex,.. 
pressio:n in sympatq w1 th GeNany against the Fremb oceupation ct the 
Ra.hr in January, 192:3111 F'or a hundred da:,s after Feb~~r.Y 5, miners and 
iWWWI • 
. . 
25~ !!: Na.ta:cms, III (Feb:ru.a:ey-... Aprll, 1920), 53; Dem$tmus . . . 
Ca.clama:nos, Report en the Saar Basin," League ot Nations. 9.tficial J~ 
(Maroh, 1920) 111 PPo 47""'49, as quoted in ~ssell, The Saar, PPo Ia.i>m: 
2°wambaugh, :~.t !aEJlbisc:i.te, ppei 78""'79~ 
27 .. . · 
Ibide, PPo 81"'82; J!!?t ;xork ~s., August 9, 1920, Po 2o 
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railway workers dem.onstratedo. The Goveming Commission, again imposing 
nw.rti.al law, decreed heavy penalties for all actions disturbing the 
t:ra.nqcility cf the region, including public eriticism or the.Coomd.ssion<> 
:r.n May, the teagu.e Council acted upon Sa.arlander petitions against such 
stringeney- and o:tde:ried the Commission to moderate its policyo This and 
.an impending League imrestigation of.' the Saar situation chastened the 
Commission and gave rise to elation among 8aarla.nders tor their "vicwrytt 
ever SO=~all.ed fo:r,,eign. oppressicno 28 
Practically every-measure pl"QIIJ.Ulgated by the Govel"ning Commission 
· met with strong SU.rlander crl tioo.sm, particularly directed against 
Chairman Raul.to Besides demanding more Ge:man cf'f'imals, the Sa.arla.nders 
agitated for a larger police fo~e, tor. st?ictly Geman CUr.Nm©Y, German 
courts, and for the establishment of: a territorial legislatureo Although 
. . 
:military occupation had nom.i:nall.y ended, French troops were retained. in 
the Saal" to supplement the local policeo Expenses of' theLeiague regime 
were home by local revenues; and the Saar oould not af'f'oro the force of 
.e,~am_!rl.e which it neededo But the existeme of' French troops on es ... 
sentia.lly Geman soil increased the danger or violence and contributed w 
. . . . 
other grievances as well,, The Saarla.nders accused:. the French forces of' . 
. .. ' . . .. ·, . ' . ' . 
' . . ' ' . ' ' I • . • 
engaging in pl"Opagandistio activities and intimidating the popula~e; .···.J:3&r· ..... 
. . . . . . ,· 
I 
hind this suspicion lay the constant f'ear of Jrrench annexation, which the 
Sa.arlanders regarded as a real threat,, The situation was eased. s@mewbat 
. . I 
i.n 1926 when the bulk of the French forces were withdrawn to Lorl"ai'3,?9 
; 
Ano·ther perennial pr:oblem was the demand fo:r a SU.r parliamen;t~ . 
,..,. ........ 
28Ibid.,, Apnl 24; 19239 Po 4~, July' 2, 19239 Po 2, and Ju;LY' 3, 1923, 
Po 4o . - I 
i 
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,' 
j 
Althoogh the Goveming Commissior,/oust0111ar.ily ~onsu.lted the loelal as= 
/ 
semblies, this was not enough f(}i'> the Saarlanders who :frequ.entl;r raised 
. .· 
the ()lry of '~dietat@rship., '' As .!a oomession to this demand, the Com"" 
I . 
/ 
mission permitted the establi:shment of an Advisor.v C<>uncil or thirty 
' 
members on Maroh 24, 19220 /Perhaps it was well that.this Landesra.t had 
110 legislative power, for its :first P.t"esident, Bartholoms:l!s Kossman, 
I 
showed. little inelina.tiorl to cooperate with the CGllmJission and declared I . 
I 
in his opening address that the Sa.arla.nders were :recognized as German, 
I 
even by Versailles, al'l}i that their sentiments would- never ehange)O 
Besides creating the Governing Commission, Versailles provided :for a. 
/ 
Io'rench agency for tae economic eont:rol of the Sa.arla.nd., The French state 
Mines Administration undertook this tu.notion and its efforts i..rere like"" 
'!tldse met w.i, th ho~tili ty' o In its first year it introduced the franc in 
payment to the .coal miners, and by 1923 the French currency was made or ... 
ficiale3l Th~, relative prosperity which this acti~n b;r,ought to the region 
! . 
i 
cr>ee.ted. a new French hope that the Saar might vote for status ~ in 1935, 
although tµ.e former belief that it would incorporate itself into France 
had been /J.a.rgely abandoned by 1922 or 1923.., 
~ saa.rlanders were of a distinc:lltly diff~rent mind, however>, and 
.I . . . ' ' . 
campaigned . strenuously against . the French schoois ·. established by. the .Mines. 
Administration.., Fear o:f propaganda and intimidation pl"Oll'lpted new charges 
against the Governing Commission that the schools were being used. to 
fore:ibly indoctrinate the children of the territory., In this instance, 
the League Coonoil found no ca.use to reprimand theCommission;'.32,the 
301".mnbaugh, §!!.t Pleb1sc1 te, l)o 880 . 
3'J ~~Times, May 20,' 1923, sGC., VIII, Po 4., For a discussion of' 
the Freneh state Mines Administriation, see,Flo:rdnsky, ·§!.!£ st:rugU;t, PPo 
55..620 I 
32Ne'! ~ ~' July 8, 1923, p., 2o 
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schools were not, in fact, under the Commission's authority,. Bu.t this 
did not lessen the criticisms., Rather than recruiting or ooe:roing fol" 
attendance as · the Saarland.e:rs oharged, even non-employees , voluntarily' en ... 
rolled their children in these bilingual schoolso This practiee was 
abolished by the Comm.ssion in 1924 in a conciliator.v move.. As the com ... 
mission relaxed its control, however, attendane.e steadily increased so 
that criticisms were agai~ raised by 1930~ This furor wa.s over twenty .... 
four schools out of 510 in the Saar, whose enrollment ~f 3000 represented 
only 2 .. 4 per cent of the t.ota1)3 ) 
.,..,,,,,. 
Labor organizations, too, were dissa.tis(:ied withtheii:·positionunder 
the League administration, claiming that their counterparts/ in Gemany had 
greater influence., In 1921, the Mines Admim..stration concluded an agree ... 
ment with the four largest unions, recognizing. them._as·:tegal.age!lts fQr 
the first time.. Meanwhile, real wages remained at th, J.913 level in· the. 
Saar and were thus higher than those in Germany O , Even the work week was 
reduced.. Bat the Saar unions agitated for more ~ontrol over wages, hours, 
. .. . . 
and working conditio~, for ''more etf'i.cienttt German ~neers, and :for~. 
better social insurance.34 Another charge.was that two French companies, 
Petite Rosselle d.e Wendel and Sane et Moselle, were sinking horizontal 
' • I • , .·· .·, .· • • 
coal shafts from Lorraine into the Warndt; a Saai- district.· This had the 
. . . 
er:rect or drawing Saar workers onto French terri tor,y and was said to be · 
:tor the P1?"POSe ot obtaining pro ... French votes .. Also,· Enieh.tactics were 
supposedly designed to exhaust Saar coal reserves·bef'ore·l93.5. in antici-
pation of' rattaohem.ent. France pointed out, however,. that Saar coal was 
'.3'.3wambaugh, Saar Plebiscite, PPo 93 ... 97, .·1~5 ... 116; New York Ta:_mes~ De- · 
cember 12, 1924, Po 3. · · . · . · · . · 
'.34wambaugh, Saar Plebiscite, p. 115. 
i 
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French propert.y until l,935 and she would deal w.i th it as she chose)5 
Despite all these manif'esta:tions of' a:n:ti...,Frenoh feel:t:n.g, F'rench hopes 
for a favorable plebiscite only wavered., neve:r died,!) By 192:3, with mo:r>e 
Fl"ench capital moving into the Saar to replace the worthless m.a.rk, some 
influential Frenchmen began to believe that the decision fora status quo 
settlement had a. good chance a.nd began urging that this goal be furtheredo 
Coupled with the separatist :movement in the 'Rhineland wh;e,h was designed 
to create a buffer state under French influence, a similar> attempt was 
ma.de in the Saa.re The Saarbund, an organization formed to p?>~©te Saal" 
in.d.ependenoe, published its own newspaper, !:!, ~. Courrier 2! !!, 
Sar.~, which the Germans alleged to be part of the French spy networko 
IAttJ.e progress appears to have been made by any movement expressly op., 
posing reunion of the regi,on with the Reich, and the Saarlande:ris called . 
:t"or a ninety ... nine per cent expression of public support for ;s:!i,~«> 
The a.nti ... Frenoh Sa.a:rlanders only redoubled their efforts when this figu.re 
seemed threatened by Fra.nceQ The fall or the franc in 1926 and the re,., 
vived stability of the new geld mark heightened the p:ro ... ~niut'l,'l fervorQj 
In the previous year the Ml impact of German na.~onalism had been Eihciwn 
when the Saar landers, .in direct defiance of the orders of the Governing 
Commission, tiu~ed out in huge m.unbers for. a German celebr~:tionl> The· 
Commission was totally incapable ot quelling. the. demo:nst:r.at:i,on;,,36 
Despite the almost unanimous intransigence toward the r .. eague ad ... 
mi.nistrati.on, the economic situation d.et:initely favored the Ter:t1J.toeyo 
On January 10, 1926, in acoordance with the Treaty of Versailles, a Franco ... 
Saar customs Union was established, and.tariff barriers were raised 
. '.35cowa.n, Fran!! SS, !,ht ~£, PPo 147 ... 1480 
36wa.mba.ugh, Saar Plebiscite, PPo 91,, 98...10011 
, 
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concluded which all.owed thos~' Saar pwdu.ets which competed with Frame to 
.. .I. 
flow daty ... free into the Reicho 'l'h.us, dutd.ng the prosperity of the late 
/' ! t 
twenties, virtually two 34rge markets were open to the 'rem to?y, while 
. . I 
it remained relatively sheltered ~m the tu11 impact of the Great De,... 
pressiono · tJnemploymen} in the region nevertheless rose tl"Clll 2000 in 1928 
to almost 45,000 by ~;:32)7 The Saarlanders claimed that Ge:m.an;r; which 
paid. their social ~ unemployment insurance benefits as pl'Ovided by 
Versailles, was ~eir only'. salvation, and that France should, be morally 
obligated. to buy.in.ore ceal since she had all but closed their German 
mrketo Thoug~/the Governing Commission's :r.oeaction to the onset ct de-
- . ' ' ' 
pression was ~onstructive a.nd enlightened, it was ~ble to win the 
support or the peopleo While it continued to o~a.te within existing 
:reve~es anti reduced the salaries of government officials by six percent, 
the Saarl~ders complain~ that taxes were too higho38 French efforts to 
pacify the region were all in vain, but their faith in a stat~. 2··.plebi ... 
soite persisted to the endo 
,In 1924, an "era of good feeling" between the Saar and F:ra~e was 
:lnaµgurated when the lib~ral goverment ot Edouard Herriot suoo•eded the 
,,' I ,I 1 , 
09t1aervative and a.nt.1.-0eman lis!'·•atttpm:,. whiob had. pided the .destinies 
I 1° • 
. ~t ~· 1:lnoa 1919~ A definite olwlge of pol.107 marked the next thliee 
;' ' 
·' yeare, beginning w1 th the acceptance ot the Dawes Plan~ Both the easing 
ot :reparations demands and. the RUhr evaoua.~on of August, 1924, oontr:1. .. 
. . . 
buted. to this lessening of tena1on.:,9 In 1925, .A.l'd.stJ.d.e Briand, Frenob 
37Jmt Im. ~-· Jazma17 18, 19.25, P• 2, and November S, 1920, P• 
;; W'ambiugh, MA£ dPis,c:ttrt• Po W.. ' 
38Wambaugh, _Saar> '3:l~lt>it• PP• ll3...U4. 
l.66, 39Qu.1.ncy Howe, 1i& Jerld ~~~S tht }t,rs, (New York, 19.53), PPo 160, 
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Foreign Minister, ae©epted the Gel"ltl"1an proposal t,o guarantei;:\l the Rhine 
frontier by international agreement, a suggestion which P..a;vm@nd P·oin:(;)ar6, 
a.s head of the B'l-<2£ ~g~, had t·wioe ref"llsedo In re'tum f@?> a promise 
that Frenc:h ti-oops l<JIQluld leave Ce.logne, and that othe:r> Rhinela.'l'.ld problems 
negotiateo From this arose the Treaty of Lo~arno of 1925 which guaranteed 
the western frontiers created by Versailles and apparently ~Ugul"ed ~= 
pean tranquilityo The ''spirit of wcamo'~ pervaded the Stun:" as well, and 
the immediate postwar period was succeeded by a period of l"elat,ive peaceo 
·rhe complaints by Saarlanders to the League were virtually discontinued 
after Germany joined that body in 1926,:, 4° Frenreih negotiati©ns r,,r a Saar 
settle111ent 'ti:rere opened with Gemany, even less propaganda t~s disseminated 
in the Saar by F'rench orga.niza:t.ions and individuals, and the ~!I'bl.!ng, was 
yea:r>s the situation rem.ained ©oxnpa:ratively qu.iet., 
and even less interest was exhibited for the Saar Ba.sino The Socialists 
in particular viewed the Saar as a barrier to Franco-Germ.an~ 
and supported the restoration of the Saar ti:> Gemany in retu.1°n fo:e f'avor= 
able agree.-uents concHiiHl.ing customs, mines , and the steel ind:u$try" Brland 
was also of this persuasion and in September>, 1926, made his proposals to 
Stresema.nn of .t,~!&aohement and an end to the Rhineland (;l)C©UpaM,«:llno If! Re ... 
a~ti,1,n to this arose almost i:mmediatelyo Fl"eneh st'eel marrofa~turers who 
had no Sa.ar inves'bnents disliked. Saar competi'tion and r,.ushed an end to the 
4oI:~vid '.l1ho:m.son, ed., 11 !h!_ ,!~ hr.ld m.:Jl,tOf. (6 vols; ·Camb1':'i,dge., 
1960), VI, 467...468; Wambaugh, 1!!t ,-.n._,_-..!,t Po 00., 
l}l:irlorinsky, ~ ~~t, Po 1290 
( 
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CU,st&ms Uni.on; they woo.ld obviously oppose any settlement which 'W'O'llldcon"" 
., 
/ tinue to admit Saar steel into Frame duty...f'reeo Fremb patriotic so ... 
cieties voiced their opposition as well, arguing that the Saar would be 
ot strategic value after the Rhineland evaGUation and that Saar steel 
·' 
would be of prime importance in case of war.., The public upl"Ca.r which oc-
curred. forced Mand to terminate the discussicms, but more inte;rest was 
focused on the Saar for the moment in anticipa.ti~n of a co~ciliato:ry 
French policy which might lead tc an early ra.ttachement~42 
stresemann app:roached Brian~ in February, 1929, for a Saar settle .... 
ment, and in .August plans we:N made :for f'ul'ttler negotiations in Pariso 
In the meantime, stuct,- committees had been established by the French 
Govemment9 lea.ding to new popular oppositiono The Paris·negotiations 
opened as scheduled in November, 1929, but s:tir.esema.m ha.d died in the 
interim and Briand had been replaoed. by the more conservative And~ 
Tardieuo Tardieu, .who had had an important ha,?id · in dralTing up the Saar 
statutes of the Treaty of Versailles, took the position that political 
questions were not to be discussedo Even t~ough the north.em French mines 
had been restored by this time, any' deviation from. Versailles meant to 
Tardieu a :rievooation or wartime· vieto17., Accordingly, he demanded. ex...· 
tensive German concessions (e.,g"IP that the customs Union·sb~d.c9nt,inue 
until 1950)/"'' Though portions of the talks were successful and the 
:Rhineland was evaoua·ted in June, 1930, no agreement could be ma.de. on the 
Saar., For all practical p.1rposes, this.was the la.st cha.nee for Franc, to 
··..,, 
obtain concessions by means ot a Saar se·ttJ.ement11 Feelings were mixed in 
.. France over this tum. of events, but pab1i,o opinion was generally 
42!.t! I2F'Js: ~es, November 18, 1926, Po 4Q 
4:3cowan, lr>fU'!C! !P~ ~ .§lat, PPo 1.52-1530 ·· 
museh; the ~:.~ l!~! sl! !!, §!V-~, established at Pa.r,,is in 
:li'ebnutl".Y', 1928j claimed the ©redi't, tor the breakdown cf negoi;;lat11.~nso 
'lalk still (l)fr@1tila't;,ed th,t;t't the Saa:ir wo1ild V'Ote in its own inte:N>st tor 
W1 th the a.ppa:Nnt, t•dlu,:re of' negcti.at:tons wJ.th Gemal\v i,n 1931, 
French O:fgan:b;a:t:!iOM aga,i.n d1:t0eClt,ed th~ll,:t> @mpa.:1gn t•o~ 8. !.li!!.f,, S!2, 
19 
and a new Geman lang~u~,ge :r,.e,ws::~,pr~f':11 ·the ~,!!, g~,, w1u1 :t't~'tm.ide~lo The 
w~.sm ~in S:'.!. i;.1, .. §!.\T..!. i,nte,:ned.f'i,ed 1.tes (ljl!lfflpa:ign wi presene th .. 
st,a:tus quo and began p~bl:tstd,ng a .l!i!!;'.~lfl. ~ l!. §!tE,!11 The rr1a1t11oh gove:m., 
m.en't. GonG1st,en·tJL;y N:(1-11.sed t@ sup,pcr.>t aucih a.ctiv1:t,1es, howeve:ri, and 
~tl1ni~nl.ized o·!!?gaf1li1?Jation ot propag1.nda was laCJk.:tngc The ~~,@h!il coin the 
othet' ht<:in.d~ ~mba,rided. ·t,;hs ~ .. M" ,dJ;,h p·mphl.ets, oirgani.z,ed d~ons·t:i:o.1tio:ns, 
:a.nd sporMJ:O:Nd speti1;il:u,ei, a!l wi:th goveM1mental ,t:':1,na.Mi:ngo ~n@h.pro:pa ... 
ganda stressed ·t,he ~©@:riiomic ad:~ra.nt,ages of a statu.s r~uo settlirni1111e:nt,, but the 
~~l,l'A.'I~ .. ' 
Gema.n i.nfluen®e of" ns:t:i.ona.1:1:t:y a.r.td lang,Jage, rel.i.gi.on, the bu:feaucra~y, 
labol" ur,1;JL11:H'lls t and t,he scJhg@ls: negated a.:.ny :FJ?ench advantages" 1RJsplte all 
t,h:b ~ many '.iF~Mhme.n ©©ntinued 'OO be orptb11istic., 
~fheir rrdspula,~ed b©·nt".idenre.ie ~y· be shown by the p©si'ti:l.@n ·t..ake:n by 
,J't'emh :i:n:t.~?>~sts l"®Jgttil'."'dlng the Sla<lll?' .:t-&ndesrat elections ©:f' M~,l?©h 13, 1932, 
l~~'W!Clt:'~~ 
for abzrt,entions t© sh©'i!i,t eiv.id.~n~e ~r supp@rt f())r t,he ~a~ !!2,o 1rhe re"" 
sult was the largest vote e1re1:'., M'.O)l"e@irel", while the moderate Center party 
20 
retained its contNil with fe>U'.f'teen sea.ts,, the ~cial Demeci:tiati@ NpNl= 
sentati,@n declinedo The Com.unists gained three seats 9 and the National · 
Socialist party or ~e Saar9 l'Unning fcir the first ti:m.e!l obtalned two45 
The rise ot National Socidism9 in Gemaey as well a.s the Saa!'land, was 
ominous" Its emerge:n.~e created a new situation in Eu.Npe and threatened. 
the stmeture of pfWjeo As the Nazis beca:m.e pred.Clfflina.rlt, all the.el.ab@-. 
Jl>ate ar:rangements whi.ch France had made in the ~ of !.,8CV1:*t.f: began to 
crambleo 
CHAP'rER II 
THE FIRST YEAR, 1933 
The advent of Hitl.er in January, 19.3'.3, pr11:»ved to be the ©omplet<e '!W.c» 
doing @f fourteen yea.rs of Fremh diplom®tfo As chief enforcer of the 
Treaty of Venailles, Fl'a.me o@ieupied a predominant ~siti©n in European 
affairs, but was unable and sometimes umr.Uling w effect a permanent 
Framo.,.,Qema.n reoon~iliati@no As early as 1930, the rise of' the National 
Socialists in Germany had given rise to the apprcp:t>ia.te rea©tion in France: 
an intensified suspicion of Geman na.:t.ionalism and a stiffened resolve tG 
achieve !~CU?i,'t!,ol In May, 19'.32, howeverjl Tardieu and the F'renieih Right .. 
had been defeated at the ~lls, and the ief't, led again by Hemot, SU.Cao 
ceeded to powero Backed by the Radical a:n.d Socialists parties, Herriot 
seemed amenable to a policy of re~onc:Uiation with Gemal\Yo One of the 
mai.n stumbling blocks to this, however, was the question of disa:r:mam.ento 
The disarmament contre»versy, one of the most impol"t,,ant se:r.i.es of. 
diplomatio negotiat::lrons in 'the early th:irti.es, was rooted in the unful ... 
filled priov-'.hions of' the Tnat7 of Versailles" Gema.ey al.cme had been 
disamed under the Treat;y11 b.tt that d.ocnwent also sti.puated 'that al.l 
!i).1:ope should. undet"ta.ke a limitation of amso Yet only the Wa.shir1gton 
Naval Conferene)e of 1921...J,922 had been held, and its deciisicns had nc't 
seriously a.f'f'eoted t,he position of' France vis ... ~ ..... v.i.s Gemanyo Oemany 
felt at a serious disadva.nt.a.ge opp~site the greatly supe'.l'ior F~eh 
21. 
22 
military f'@rees, and the o@cupation of' the lblhr in 1923 pointed up Geman 
wlnerability,., still, Germany was willing to maintain her restricted 
military level if only Euro:pe would disum w a eo:J.Tesponding degree~·· 
France, however, h~d that her future seciurity might be ;imperiled by. 
Ge:rma.:ny's gi,ieater war poitential and was determined to iDSUN this se= 
cur.it:, before disamingo 2 Germ.any, on the other ha.nd!i began to demand 
ro.etchbel'!.~ (equal rights) in ~maents after· 1926 in ©pp@Siti@n 
t«:> the F?>eneh stando When the teague=spons@Nd Disa.:rmament ~nteren.ce 
met at Geneva in Feb:t-ua..ey, 1932, CbanCJ~l©r Heimd.<llh Bruening immediately 
demanded §!.eicihb~htigu:gg for his eountry o Whan Tardieu refused even 
to consider Gema:nytis elaims, Germ.any balked and eventually withdrew from 
the negotia:ti©nso The intl"ansigeme of Fnooe on this point @ontributed 
to the fall of Bruening, and likewise intensified Geman na.ti@nali.sm., 
The pressure "'f public opinion foreed the resignation of Tal'dieu as wello_ 
~gh Br.itish efforts, however, the Ger.man equality thesis ms then ac ... 
J 
cepted in principle and GC'l'...rmany was pe~ tted t@ rejoin the disa.mament 
talks w.lthout eomprmising its pcsitiono; 
Facing the new Fremh gwemm.ent.cf. Hem<'>t at the ~onfereri©e tab.le 
I 
in May, 1932, was a new German mim.~:t.r;r led by the ~onsel\'V'ative Franz. yen 
; 
Pa.peno The French had little sympathy for the Geman demands, mt o~er 
factors, such as the ef'fe~ts of the WlOlrld depression, counselled a re= 
duction in defense spendi:ngo Hemot realized that g;r,ea.t economies 
could be effected . through disamament, and he di.d mt f'orget that FrancG ... 
---
2cameron, ~~.AW!!.~ PPo 14...15" 
3A:mol.d J0 Toynbee 19 e !t ~ticnal !U!kt, ~ (London, 
19:,3)" ppQ 267 ... 268~ 288.,,2 o He:rieina:f'ter~as ~....t!!Z .2t Int,~ 
1-l&~rf! AtXsm, t2Jgo : 
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crisis ©f ~"'ebl"Ua'.lty ill 1934, the F'rel!\~h C''!©lvernment wul.d be of tlds mind,, 
,~he p~kershi.p ~Jh,jjj,nged hands tbr.i~e 't:i1r.ui,:s in 193:3, but -the leeft preserved 
charge at the Quai. d@Or0s.ay du1<;'lng the period from De@ember, 1932, t.o 
January, 1934, and a ©«:mt.inuity ©f :f©lr.'eign po>li©y was thus maintained" 
'!'be g:r'©wth ©f ~mllil.n nat:,i©o.ujLsm 1,n 1932 augured ill f'©r Fl'en~h 
~j but, F:f>atM~~· rdid not imm®d:lately :t>ee©grd~e the g:l:"eat, danger., 
Bi tl.er& s party suff (elit'ed an appa:i:'®?Ji.t :ri~mf'f in the rtei©hs:tag 'tlllecti©lns of 
first premiership the isanHs> rrll!l!?ith awd set oJUt t© mplement Hem©t Gs plan 
to reduele ?l'dl:ifa.ry ~xpenrl!itu?>es} ll~ladier app~:r,,ently felt thei.t F..:itlel" 
Hitler obt:,ained a @om.pliant maj@ir>:1:ty in the tlei,@hstag and p:rlC!©eieded f @rth°" 
w.i th to expand Sl.1!.t>:t<>ept,iM .. ously the C'iem.an war' ma@h.in.e"' The same :month, 
creat,ed by Hemann C''ttO>er.lng., 5"t:UJ,.w 'It.he 'J!l":r·eneh Na©tion was :n©t insta:n"" 
t,a:ne©USo What A:t'nOJl.d rr@>yribee des@ribed as ~~Sillparf'i©:ial ~al:immess:®8 reigned, 
with -the :l!~t0en@h sh©'wldng 1mapp,:&~n:t. ©©©il""heardledn~ss md selt'.., 
restrainto tt6 Nevertheless, recomiliati©n as the f@'ll:U':ldation rflPf ~h 
policy was almost discardedo Paul..,,:J3oncMJ.r ma.de neiw overtures t@ Russia 
and to Italy, and f outl.owed a :more realistJ..e Une a.t the Disamament C@n.:. 
ferenceo Ef'fei:rts t@ a©hieve diS&'.fflWJlen·~ WN not yet aba.nd©ned, but the 
French we:t>e understandably anxious and hesitanto 
Outside the Govemment, the Fren@h t'ea@ti@n to the advent oif Hitler 
. ' ' 
was S'U..l"pris:b1gly :mildo Th.ere wer>e 11:Wen a'.P@l@gists for the Th.ire Rei@h 
like the eminent Fr,,ench jo1.u:0nalist, F~mand de B:mnon, wh©i assured Fran~e 
of Hitler11 s mcde?>ationo 1 Fremh Y©Uth wen @f'ten a:ttra.cted by the Nazi 
dynamismo M~~ver, Geman propaganda had S(lffle success in Franceo su~h 
manifestations of the @~ng ty!"a:n.ny as the in©reasing n'i!mllber @f refugees 
arriving in ~rls ecml.d no;t be expldned aw.y, @f eoorseo F?>en@h Catholics 
and Jews ~re ala.med® oot the anti.,.,)!alii out©ry in Ff>ame was by no means 
deafening. On the other hand, FNl'l©e began to re .... evaluate her poU,cy o:f 
bilateN.1 agreements with small eimmtri.es, and m@ved toward a closer re ... 
8 lationship with ~at Bfi;taino SurprJ.singly M@Ugb, Englanf.J.OS l"e&~ticn 
to Nazi barba.ri ties was mit1eh mol"e vlgo~s than that of Frame., This 
prompted s6me F:renehmen t© :;:oegat"d Hi:tler9 s ae@ession as a blessing in dis ... 
I 
i'gu;tseo It Wllld, they said, d:iaw the British closer to FKm~, perhaps . 
even to the allian~e £or whi~h France had been wcrkingo 9 . A df~passio~te .. · 
and sober spirit prevaded even the a@tlllcunts of Geirman events in &!,Tem:e,, 
which earned no edli. torial.s calli.ng .fer strong governmental action . against 
7see Fez,mnd. ,de Bl<inon, l'Z.tl!Sl!.~!!!!'!l!., ;1218~ (Paris, 1934)0 
8!Eiti!b. ~ ~l~, IV, 465,.,4660 
9Alexander Wer>th~  !:il, ~ (tondei11, 1935), PPo 20 ... 24o1 
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Gemanyo The French seemed pacit.i,~ in their attitude and. calm in their': 
a.pproacho 
Not so in the Saaro '!het>e the advent of Hitler dest:roye<f the solidity 
of pN>-Geman sentiment,, The Nazis had been orga.n:tzed in the . Saar for 
sae time before March, 193'.3t and !turmabteilung (SeAo) and .~tzstaff_!J 
. . 
. (s.s .. ) organizations had. been holding nocturnal military drillsolO Yet · · 
the prevailing opinion in the region had been that Hitler would never 
come to powr;. he was riegarded by most to be but a passing phenomenon of 
the ·times,, Consequentl.y, some ccntusicn a:,ose wb921 Hitler •s named 
Chanoalloro Only the Saal' Nazis looked upon his advent as an u~d 
blese:lngo Saar Catholics, seventy ... two per·cent ot the poplllation, lme'I! 
full well tba t th4:'1:r coNl.igicnists in the Reich were ai.ost 1.1 'V'l2.lner-
able to Nazi persecution as were the Jews and Conumml1t1. SU.:ri Soc1a11s.ts 
and Commurr11ts wre u:t:.ural.ly opposed to the new Reich regime; the Center 
party 3':'ealized, that Nazi, cppre11ion might-· exte•ded to other pclitioal 
groups; and the la.bQio mov11111e1'i't, o:r the Saarla:n.d was alienated tNm the 
Na1ie by theil1' 1uppreasion of German labor union,~ 'l'hua the 10-cal~ed, 
United F:ront o.1' the Saar>• whicih had. oontidently pred:1eted a m.nety-n1.ne 
P8l' cent .me to;, ~t$!9b,e.91!!, was ~·11• ~.·~ ~·.i9'~~d-~ 
tensitied Geman propaga~a efforts peio,uad•d ~~,j~i; .J:~"·~~i:t1',}:~,· 
' ' , . ' ·. ',' ', 1 ·' ·,.·,,'' .. -,. ".".;•,\i"•' .1.:.:,.· .. ':·.·.· ·1' 1;' ·.i,, •'.· .... ,.,,co . . '._',·;:·, .. , ··,. 
Saar except the Cenmimnists and some Sci,oialists to retttffl to· a pro ... Geman 
attitudeo12 
trnlike the F:r>ench, the Gem.ans were acutely awaN of the approach1:ng 
plebiscite. They- we:t>e also ~c:nscioua 0£ the tMenddu.1 qo.estion o.t 
, I 
10~ T•:es (P&ri,s>, February 22, 1933, Po 2o 
11cown, :Ft'tln~e ea 1.ll!. §!.•£, pp-, l58tf' 0 
12wambaugh, Sa.4:J:l l!&e!sc.;l~e, pp., 1a ... 12~. 
:nationalism involvedo That the rattachaaent ot the Saar."to the. Reic,h ~de 
little econGmic sense appears to have had. tittle :1nt.J.uenee on the German 
•nds it was the f'aotor of nationalism which eoantec1~· In Mein gampt. 
' " ' 
. . . 
Hitler had stressed Gtmaan h1sto17 and all it involved, am expressed an 
urgent desire f'or al1 .Gei'man$ to come uder one flag~~' Although the 
Nas 1.s . had intem.al arises w1 th .which to eentend and W9f'9 busy in Autri.a 
. . .. 
and. elsewhere,. the Saar was never f'orgotteno . !)ff ~tr !4ms,1t made 
several personal tl'tps to.the Saar bordul4 and at ~retNqUent inter-
vals sent top lieutenants w evai.te the si~tton anti eoordina.te the 
Saar eampaigno To make certain that the sau wuld. eventually 'be 1"9-. 
united: with the Reich, Hitler aclepted a dllal. strategy: ·t1:nt, ·~ iuuN . 
an overwhelming pro-~man plebiscite by agitation and propaganda in th•· 
:ngion itself; and second, to win mtta~~StDt without a plebiscite 
·thro11gh .dlplomatio negotiations with FNM•, },t poasible~· . 
'l'he Nazis wasted little time in orgard.ling the Saar populace. In 
Jul.7, • Geman Front (Pfttsche n,m) was established .which :incorporated 
; ' ' 
several lmll.1 part:les and even the large Catholi~ Center~· .Th• C&tholios 
d.1.d. not aotually join this grou.p until OGtober, and then oril.y' reluctantly 
·:rudl:th::::z.:'!'Z~ttt~!~'f~··· 
ma~on, d.ee:1.gned to reaeh fl'IU'1 sui- tamil.:, and ,.~- th~ to support 
: o • I ' I ' .' :' .· ( ' • ., ' 
""Uonal .Secialiam .and Geftfl&Zl1o ~- .• type ot ·sec~t ·polio·•. (Or:A9llf--
. . \ .. 
5le119t) was inatituted u part of the Naai J>l"OCNmo1S . wtth H:1t3.er91 
· 13 . . . . . .· ·.. i . ;- - · .: ;. . . ..... 
. Adolf" Bitler, Mein Qtpt, tr. :&Allph Manheim (131,,aton, c. 1943), 
PP.· o 97-ll9 et Pl,SS:blo....- ·· . . > 
. -- . 
· Vlror Hitler's speeches on these oecas1one1 . see No:man H~~ Baynes, ea .•• · 
Th• a,eches of Adolt maw: (2 .vols; London, 1942), II, 108'4.1086., ll8.5· . tD6, 211:tmo · · · · .. 
lSSee norinsky, · §!!!. Bt£K!ll• PPo 131-1380 . 
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. . 
during the twenties had been relatively tree()£ ut@wa:f'd ev&nts, but mw 
this ciba.ngedo V1~l.ence, imAmidat:1cn9 ~d kldnappings became almost 
commonplace~ The Nazis intended f@r the ~landf;l'.f~ _ in all d!strici:,s -te 
vote heavily f'·or m,~'t!,~~~!!!io Oppiositi@n simply C\@Ud net be pe:rmi:ttedal6 
One or the f'inrt manifestations of intensifi,ed Nazi p7.>essure oocurred 
at nadwe.iler on Febra.aey 20, 1933·., At the amicipal elect10n there 
pel'haps 400 Nazis demomtr~,ted wt~ .. . .i.ott<.>ne~~ befo" · tbs ~ll~ ~es~ 
When gunfire began, the police l'le.1u~ta.ntly intervenedo The 'Marls re-
treated tc their headqt:U.arters I but were sot,,n overc@me and sear<Shed., ·No 
weapons were :found, and, sime injury w thooe involved had been slight, 
no arrests -were madeo The leniency of' the ~lice is explained by the .. 
fact that they themselves were intimidated by the Nazis., Li.ks most Saar-
landers, the police ba1ieved that ?,#!'.,ttacb,em;;, was inevitable~ -i-when it did 
come, the ~lioe wanted to keep their j@bs and escape possible l"&prisal.~1'7. 
Whether Nazi demonstrations :sueh as the one de:s©ribed ha.d nm.ch e:tf',ct 
would be diffi,cult to detemine sima ·the balloting was dens in see~eto 
In ~ case, the voting at L'Ud.weiler was heavie-r> thal)_ at any prev!QV.s. t,µn.e,. 
and the National Socialist vote dO'ij:bledo. By oontras·t~ the Comrllil.n;t.st vo-te 
; . ' ' . . ... '· ' : ',.'. . . '.··.. . .. ;, . 
remained virtua.1.i:v uncihanged, 'that1gh th$Y lost t~ ~eats a~ th~ir ma;.' 
jo:ri ty-.18 What is probaol.y more si.gnif"l.can·t than ·the resui~ oi; the ·· 
:~d.weile:r ball.o·ting :ls the fact that ·the Ma.zis, ·with the lfl()st ~xt,ns.ive 
" 
political. organiza·t,ien in the Saar, contJ.nued. ·this type of' a.g:itat1ono 
1.7:ta,i.zabe'th WiskertM:nn w~qfhe S&a.r i~lebisci.tesi •• The :Political Quarteri;t, 
V.I (January, l93S)fl 49-S9e 11 -· ....... •• - • ... 
1.8~ l°sP.l, :i,ebt'l.llary 21 1 193'.3, Po 8-11 
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A few days lateri the Goveming C~ssion :ma.de p11bli@ m.@re im"@l'\m 
mation regal"ding Nazi ai©tie>nso In November, 1932fl ~:ng tl(',ll the ext!leI119. 
racism. mibited by the Germans, the C®mmission had. searohoo Nazi head ... 
qurtel°So There they f<Mffld. evidence that the SoSo and. SoAo had @:f>ganized 
i'ull=scaJ.e _mil:ita:ey trd.ning for assalllt tr@cps, amwlan@e @@l",Ps, moto;r... 
cyelists, et©o The Gwemng Commission, headed by the Englisman, 
Ge@ffrey Go Kno:x:,19 had suppressed these f'i~ings 'lmtU_!'$~~~ 22, 1933; 
fearing that an earlier diselowre mlght dis:rupt_the Dlsama.ment C©ln,.. 
fer&mee "When the inf'C)ma.ticn was published, the Sur Nazis, r.>et.Nated 
across the German 'bl>rdero20 The French, already @@merl'l.ed ©ye~ tbe Saar's 
strategie position and. s~te, did not take the N~rt S@ lightlyo 
Still another incident ©Ontl:-1.bated W growing .F.'nm.©h ©©>neemo On 
Ma~h 6, &! T_emps NJ)Ol"'ted that Geman tl'OOps were massing OD the Frlan~O= 
Getman oordero It was dis©@vered that the Nazis -were violating the d~ 
militarized. Rhineland z@ne by occupying the old barracks at K:eblo _Qn 
Ma.~h 10, the Gem.ans w1 thdrew, but left behind them a defiant eiM.llenge$ 
Waving the imperial f'la.g and singing peut,schlanJ! !l>et Alles8 and the 
Horn lf!!!!! !ti~:)) they. wa.med that France Wffllld have w deal dif'terentl;y 
with the fh:ir.d Reich than it had with t~e '~?'X1$t R~bliclil.~f 'Weimar0 2l • 
. . . ' . . ' . . . . 
After some hesi ta tion:ll. J!i'snce l"ea.cted by p?>Otesting through her am,... 
bassa.dor to Germany, And:t-'( Fran~ois ... P\ometo To the Reichsmimster ct 
l.9.Besides Knox,.the Commission was ~cm.posed ct Drown Ehrenrooth 
fr• Finland, Barthol.o:mal!s Kossman of the Saar, Jean Momze ot France, 
and Dro Milovan Zo:t"icic of' Yugosla.v:b., in 193'.30 n.~:rd.nsky .. Saar strugsle. 
Po l.46o · " - ' - .... 
20MP. L~ February 23, 193,, Po 2o 
21,Ibido ,i Mll>eh 6, 19:331t Po ] . ., See also kt 1!8"1f: cf March 11, 19'.33, 
p., B, March 12, 1933, Po 2, and. Mat'Clb 16, 1933, Po ., fer ether repcJl>ts 
ct the Kehl inoidento 
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Foreign A.f'fai.rs, ·t.he Ft"enebman pei1'.lntEJ1d @ut the p@ssibl.e repew-.il'!.llssi.i,ns @f 
such :1.midents on F'r'aOO®""Cffim.an r.e.lati@nso ~n Konstant:ltn wn Neu.nth 
?'&plied somewhat lae@nieall.y that ci,:nly «:i)ne""tenth· of' the Kehl f@~CJe was 
a.med, and these with pis'tll)>ls and hunting r"i,fJeso Fa.rtheawrei\11 he ex .... 
' 
plained, this mi,no;r' f@r-0e had t;,a.ken a p.o>si tio:n f.ffl the Saar ooroer to pre ... 
vent replJll"ted agitation,; Mor~ aet:t11''1&taly, the Saar Socia.list newspape:t>, 
.!2l.J.m!immjh, made it ©leal" that; ·the Kehl. :t'o~e was hurasdng Saar wrk=· 
men ©©ming f'rom Gell.'U.Ui.ny <l 22 ·tr,eneh publie rea©t.ion t© the K8hl imident 
was subdued; and only the obsi,ut>e F'i!:'en@h League made any rep:t'esenta.t.i.cm 
at al.le With the vene:t~ble Admiral l)1,~ien I.acaze ~esidtng, this Grgani-
zation appreved a petition (~!!,) to p~mll.ade the French Government to 
a~tivelv ~ote a arta.tA1s ooo 1Nlt,e tor the '11nc.a.ce ®f :Et1N>- and o o o 
,; .t"'~ ............ ,Jo ,_{ ... ~ -~ r·- rv 
FrelWh security., «~2:3 
Gemany eont,inVJ.ed its empa:tgn" At tme time~ a pat>ad.e was .. held_in 
Berl.in with diffe!"ent mal"'i!lhers repNsenting th.cwse te1'1l"iwrl.es detached 
from the .Reich, ineluding &hemia, Alsace=Lol"raine, am the Saar.. Things 
were not so pea.~eful i-n the Saa'.ti whe:r.>e ''e,i@llisi©ns" o@curred .frequently, 
particularly between Nazis and Cwmu:msts" The ~li~e seemed impotent tc 
prevent these a1~ts1t and u~.ly n®> arirests were made"24 
. . . . 
. TM propaganda ©&n~dgn ISB.l'l'ied. @n by .Gemaey .Showe~ that. Hi:t.'l~r·'was.·.······· ·.··. ·. 
. ' . . . . '.· . '• ... ·:,,,' ... · . 
willing to pay .heavily~ ooth in gold and manpcwer, ·to gain the Saaro A · 
myriad of met,hods was tl'iedo One was the beaming @f German radio . programs 
especially tic the &a.r~ Nazi b:t"Cad~a15't,ers vented their anger on the 
Governing Commi.s~io:n as h.ad pre©eding Ger.man and Saar giove:mments :before 
22:t'bj.,d.,, March 11, 1933, ~ .. 8, and Mal"Ch 16, 1933, P& lo 
23!'b1d~·, Marfllh 12,. 19:33, P~ 3o 
24:I:bido, Mat-eh 21, l.933, J>o 8 11 and Ma~h 29f 1933,. pQ 2., 
t.hem.Q Sro1me ~if t.hed,'.I:' m~ir,f'~ :hll.sis.tent ri.ompl.ai.nt,s we:t>e tha;t, the Iea~.e l"egime 
pe:ndt·ted the ex~.st,e:me o,f' p.t>oi...,Jl:l':.,,~n/1,llh o?>gantzat:1.cns :ln ·t,he :!"egion and t,ha:t 
German refugees wer.·e iJllowed to erit~,e:ft" ·the Sas.:rio 1:"hl,is lat,·t,e:r.o cir:w11u.11tance 
. . 
tended t.c :i.no:r,ease tbl!!l n1:.1mb91:r· @i::f' mil:U~a:iM1t ant:i, . ..,N1H,:b1 in ·the :region, (il:r•ea·t .... 
ing a ~en·ter ~t (llpip:J1dit,i.c:n agid .. n!Slt lt~.tl,t):t'(l 25 
Probably the m@1t, ·1;1.s:·1111 and :t:f~etf.1.en'I!.\ Nazi p~1·pagani:1a meast'l:Ni was the 
staging ~t gigo.rt~"i.~ <:J.e1m1C11n.,rt::nt:\l@Jns,> At, t,'.ll..mes the Go,e:f:m\.ng i:~ssion 
int,erdi.ct,ed wcih displ,4ys, (i)il:rt,f.!nsl'bl.:;r t~t~ Pf1t»t,e,~·t~. m:!t :111or,)tttes and. p:f0pe:r1b;y o 
In such ~asas, th& blat.ilfA t'tlm;11ly held 'Mlle~lt'.f mass meet,lngs on Ge~ s@:11. 111 
paying or,, p:rov:~.di,:ng ·the Saa:r!l.e.nde:l'.•t w:1:th ·t:!':'anspGri):f''ht·tiein tc atte:nd1, 11hus 
it was diff'~.e\tlt, ·t©1 de't,e1N1d.r~e how ma.ey Saar.ilandf.l:f'S atterided en p~,rr~iple, 
orgard.~ed. t(Q) the lasrt da·t,dl~ am usYtll.all,y- fea.tU1t>ed an (1'J)Utsu.ndi.ng speaker 
su.ch as :Ngi.r,pr1al. Naizi l.e,iu3iti11s, Gti®Yro:lng, Ck»ebbels" ~:it ~li;ln Mltler 1:n pe:,scno 
the message w.as nea.:rly· alwll.ys t;,he i,:am.e:: V\i1it~ fit.Vt' 'the Fa:the!!land, it will 
treat l)''Olll well; the Nazi !ltev<Ol]jtt,:~,.tYn will ~~lve all.. y@u.:f pNbJL•si 'the 
a.t't,ended by Na.ids and Sai.a~l~nd~?."$l !l etwen taki.ng into a~©©ltint the Nazi 
penchant f©>r exa.ggei••at:1.(Q)n <QlU thls: sCJ©l'il:'~o 26 'f'l:ds: tl,mpaig.n;. based pt"'1ma:t"11y 
Nazi st,11ength r.ather rapidity .@lffi.l[tri1g th~ :mirdkile a:mi l©JW®l'." in<Ql©.m® gNUpso 
Youths wel"e at;t,W#.1,©ted by the 'ri.g@i'!? and m:tili'taney @f Nat:i@nal S©©ialism 
and even laoor wa.:med w~dt-h<eJ Nazi sppea.l., 
At :tl:r.frt:il n@ ©rgan'i~f.Ml opp::q1s::lti@n a.ppeare.·d t@ C!@unteri the Na~i eiffo,t"to 
-
26se~ Le T 
de:m@nstratiooi' in 
:31 
example, threi (;«}~.nirsts f'av-ot'ed ~S,~,, :1!2,0 '!:.mt th@ SIQ)©iall.i!:it~ argm®d that 
the pJt ®bi.s©:l t~ be postpeilfM:!id,, 21 Na:tl©inallsti© f e:irw@l" was ;;it)!]S<;';:!'?iwaS1ed wh~n 
tb~) G©ve~ning C:©>mmissi@n, af'te.i:t:' e@!.'.f."liiei1f• denius, all.lQ)wed th@ :.!il'~.st:JLk& t(}) 
h~ f'loWJ1.,,28 A.:rrid wh~n Gemany s'.igl!il.@d ai. (;©:!'M2@'.td®.t with ~me in July,, _1933'1 29 
@ent 
s t~rtrns 1JU© 
u:;.,.::.~>,'l.ll.l;:,·~l'tJ 
teri ©l!:!,nto Gemany a.ssu:r•ed itself ~pe&tedly @!':' Saar, d~'1ir©ti@n to th~ 
H@i©lh; 1:lltle:t' himself said s© in Aug~st. 11 19:30',)0 
""It 10'')YQ ·~ . ., 0£. 1,,n J , . {) "u'\':l~i.JL t!)!~)Oo, 
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nwun~ed t,hat 80i000 Saa1!."lande:t'."S heal"d Hitleil° sp,ink at N1lerde:l:'Wald, the 
So~iillst;s ,elai:.m.ed that, tro.m l2f!)OOO 't@ 15 ~ooo SLttendred a r~ly ::JL~d by ls'l.ax 
Braun at M~'11nkirehen; and 'th~ C@'t1IDitilJJicitsts dieiies'laried that 15,000 S~a?'landers 
met with th~ at Saarbro@t;keno 31 l~:ach or "these f':igures must b~ assumed. 
the plebiscite,, 
was lal"gely ignored~ su.~h as that ©±"' the Asso©iation F"ra.nn~a aiissee de la 
~~]~~",'fol,.~~ 
~o Jl!f]tually, 'the :~"'1°entih Lef't was beglnni.ng te agree with the Right 
that the Saa.t" ·1u'l\der league admtims't,:t"ation ©l()Ul.d serve as a valuable bu.1~:fer 
against Hi tlerl,a.n Gel.'Wi,iny o S©nMs• also sti.ll held ©:l'llto the hope for 
--
3l1i ~,$ Augtt1st 29~ 193'.3, pp,,, 1""°2, 8., 
321naovic Naud~au, ,rnlLe ;:',a1i:>re et, :s01n plebics~lte~ iltl l.l1Illustration, 
fW1' '\;''ln?'V fM .. "'.ii~ '] 9'l'~ ,, r., 0 1," ' ,:;»11 "'ll6 _____ , 
v,)y,11,"1,/1.i V'S.tty GV@ l,'" ,.11,.11)!~ :Po ,.:::,ete :1n:r:1?~, pp., «J"f!n:,_; " 
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obtaining full repa,t>ati©Jns, and wo-uld retain the mines as se©1!llri ty.., The 
Frencih G-over:nment did no·t suppo:r·t this view, or if it did, re111ained 
silent"' tiba.t ~"'reneh money entered the Saar for p:ropaga.ndisti© purposes 
ea.me not from the Goverment bu·t from individual Cath.olil())Sj S©J@ialists, 
or Jews .. Perhaps a few industnalists having Saar investments ©r ©©vetous 
of Saar eoa.1 supported the .~ti1s 9!2,,,33 Ent no one, apparently~ had held 
any hope for a pro=F?>eneh vote sin~e 192:30 
An article in L!, Teimu[ of April 23; 1933; illust.:rates wi.th particular 
vividness the prevailing F:Ninch attitude toward. events in the Saar., Head ... 
lined "Aggression against F:t.,enehmen,, e11 the story created a fu:ror$ but not 
enough to f"ol"Ce action by the C-ovemrti.ent., .L!, Temps r,pol'ted tna.t three 
Jhen.chmen had engaged three Saarlanders in what appeared ro be a frlelldly 
argument or conversation at Saarb:roeckeno . A,s :t:tu~y welie spea.ki.ng in F:r>ench, 
probably in loud voices at, 2 :00 aoma , they ;a. ttracted a gl'."Oup ell: a.boot 
twenty Maz:is" This encounter precipitated a. brawl.·· in which a t"evolver 
. .··.·. ·.·.·.·. :· ., · .... '-· _, 
been acim1sed of firing the 
· fo.r,e. incareerat~d,iri th$ ..,.i;-;.1~.::,un lr.10l;fflla:r';'/ 't10" lt'>9Cl:O'V;e:t>.;i,.,\li1v<11/'tv.tAae·· ,j_Je\'.'itt'rj::~s 
s,lstainecl····.1K·tie······~~Wlo34 . 
This story, of little significance in itself, appeared·.U)· .. ·!!. TemRS 
as symbolic of the French position in the Saato ·The.Nazis J:>&n.loose 
creating ha~e and Wl"e patronized by the policeQ> A Frenchman in the 
Saarland did not have a cha.nt'ce I>""" not even a wounded oneo other Fl-eneh 
riewspapers picked up the charge and. the · resulting •publ.ici ty gave ~lse to 
33wambaugh, ~!, ~i~j.,~, pp" 126""'1270 
34L.t l'.'!11~ Aprll 281.1 1933, Po 2o 
a m..il.d 1mwar selare., ~, Rv.ittM'Ji:t> had it, that i'rench t~@p.s wl:lluld be sent 't,o the 
Saar,).5 Had this ©ltiCUH"ed., ©f Cl(l)U:r>se, it woo.ld have bee:n. a.n lnva.sion @f 
similar instances of perse(C)uti©n or Frenehme~,., Cine rumor told cf a French 
boatman on the Rhine being kidnapped., ta.ken to Gema.ny, and. then arrested 
because he had. ~rit:t~ized H:itle:t>..36 
Fortunately$ the Frentlh Government b.ad no intention of sending t~©ps 
to the Saar siMe their ~t1esen©e would have merely led to mme~essary 
bloodshed., The Governing C©:mm:Ls:si©Jn did av~t to (:l'ill"b Na.zi""~"Nn©h ~lashes, 
howevero It :fu.rthe:t> bluntly inf@lt'llU.:Ml the Saar tandesl"at that f.llfrantle is 
................ 
be repeatedo This did not prevent the recurrence of' ineid.E11nts of' that 
kind, wt they be@ame less ±"req:uento While the C-over:ning C!~'lml:1issi©n had 
contlnued. to request supplementary p01lioemen sime the 1926 F"rench evaeru-
a tion, no f'i;u•ther in~raase of forees was a:uthori,zed in 1933$37 
Conseious of widespread popular indiff"ert:m.ee in Frame to develop"° 
:ments in the sa.arland, the influential joumalist, IndiClvic !liaudeau, 
published a series of a.rtieles in the May and June numbers @f<UIUustra= 
. ·.-. ~ ... 
tion which were designed to .instru.ct.:l.i"'renchmEl:ti. ~s!t6 ~t; ~~· ~t.s'.tak~'~n i 
~-- ' •.•" '·.'. ···-.:·. ', .·-: .. ,:·- •':)· ... '.-:·· ... ,·.·-,::··:'·:·.:·_.-·-.,-.,., ..... ·.·:,·.'.' .. \.-::·,.-:·.::-_ .. _:\';.i'·,.,;.'"·_·.\/i•',.' ... ·:··.:.,;'.:.:-. ;:.\ .. ·.:·,\.,•,'_,·';,._:._'.'"''· .. ··.-:' 
the regi.on,, Na~deau fir~t·.eXf.)l;ined >th~\~@~~8:':i~J~~~:;t Ji.;~.~···. 
to FN.ni0e, imludi,:ng the :fa.et that the x,egion p?>oduced. enough steel to 
. . . 
supply over ls)ne,,,f'ourth of Freneih needs and, t.ha. t Saar bttsine~s pa.id the 
salaries of almost 100 11000 Frencih 'WO:r>kerso:38 La.t~rarti@les gave more 
36~,b~~ M 6 19~~ s· 
,Ji. . ..,\,1.,, ay .··, ·.,1.,,11 Po .. o 
:37lbid..,, May 7, l93:3, pc, 12fj 
:38Na.udeau, ~,gl.J& Sa.:r•rie et son pl.ebi.s~ite, 1111 L9 t::ration, CLXXXV (May 
1.3, 193'.3)~ 56a The author was a distinguished Ctrated. journali.st 
for Ii!, ~,E!, and had. p,1blished several works dealing wlth oont~porary 
f'ore:ign ev·ents" 
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pel"So)nal observations: ,i:,,bt,ained through the nth@rfls @w.n. resea,~h and in= 
vestigat:.i@no Naudeau wamed. 'that a pN=Fren@h plebiscite was highly :1m ... 
probab.le Hand even undesirable, 00 wt that a ~ guo wte might yet be 
possible., He was eo.nvin©ed that many Saula.nders valued their> ecommic 
ties with France (!)Ver their ~ltul'U comections with Hitlerla:n Gem.any, 
no matter what sentiments they e,cpressed publi@ly<'l'.39 Another :factor 
which ©f'f'ered hope was the poissibil.ity that~ Surla.nders had been 
alienated by Nazi taerti@s and might desi:NJ FNMh p:r-otectioino · Naudeau 
also pointed out that ~h tradit'i@ns still persisted in certain areas 
or the Saar, particularl:, in Sa.arlouis,, though they we:re of little in= 
f'l-q,Emce or impo:rlan@e<) 
l:espite the possibility of a &tus !!S!., wtet Naudeau J:le©@gnized 
that most, Saarlandm-s hated the F1.'ench,, Un.empl.oyment, the scho@l problem, 
all. the il"t"itations that troubled the regi©Jn were la.id at the d~or @f' 
France .. While the French seE!lled distant and ~col t@i the Saar p@pllatio:n., 
the Germans were :interested and active in winning th~ to ~t:1.r s:i,.de .. · The 
Governing C~ssion 'WO'Uld not campaign for the status .9!2.; the Nazis 
spent profusely and. we:re exeieedingly we.11 organiz~/K> Nevertheless, 
Naudeau precli~ted, F'rance could win the plebiscite it. sheeh@~e ·to do. St)., 
The French must comm! t t~em.sel ves . ·tc:, an unwav:ering support ~t ~t4~4Et1' · 
inte:t'ests, and laumh a 'Vi.gor.'Ws propaganda campd,gn against the }lazis 
and for the stat.!!!, 9!2.0 B.v this means and with a fair and secllr.et plebi ... 
scite, 1':rance might sem1.re the saaro 41 
39Ibid~, May :20, 193'.3, PPo 89..,90 .. 
403'.bido, June 10, 193:3:, pp ... 209aa?.l.O .. 
l~l!b"id,;, ,Ju:ne l?, 19:3'.3 11 p" 2l~'.3; !l!l't Yo;rit. Ti.mes, September 18, 19)3, 
·Pei 12"' 
The effect of Naudeau0s s.?ltioles is ind,tem.nable, bat they may well 
have.stiff'ed the gover.m.ent to more activ'e measures~ Foreign Minister 
PauJ...,Bom<Nr created a special office for Saar affairs in tile Qllai dtl()rsa.y 
and met often with Saar.leaders., Realizing the·impo:f'tame o,f p:,opap.nda, 
he.attempted to cominci& Catholic et:ficials that theyast resist the 
Nazis by opposing a pro,-.,Geman plebisciteo42 still, Paul .. Bonc01Ui'fis stand 
on the su.r Jmi>blem remained cauti011s· and flexible .. He hoped that by 
. . 
yielding a bit on the ~' ~e might ga.i:n e@neessicns on other points 
\ . . 
which wel"e not so strongly des.ired by Hitlel"o 
While the Germans gi!d.:ned the immediate ~paganda ad~tage in the 
.·.I. 
saar itself during 193'.3, he:r dire©t diplomatic negotiations with.Frame 
over the region did net meet with· similar n~ess o. The year had opened 
with extensive F'ranCOouGefllilUl comnmm.,cations., ostensibly inspi:t"~ by a . 
mine disaster at Neunkimheno In Feb~, 193), a gas expl~sicm in this 
Saarla.nd city bad killed or injured a large number of miners~4:3 Both.· 
.· . . ' 
. . 
France and Gel'tl1&1'J.Y' used the publi@ attention· ar@Used by this tngeq as 
a sounding board fot> their conf'lictil'Jg aspinticns·in·the Saar Ba.Sino. 
When the French Government expressed their, official eo:ndol~es to 
the league ·Of Nation.$, the: .nQmil'UiJ. $0:IJ'.e~ign of the. Saar •. Geman.v>c»bj'eci~: i · 
that the saar .wa·s Geman temtotir a~ ~lu,.t any exp~ssions ct 'syiapatii" 
should be made t~gh German diplomatic, chafmelsoq4. Usirtg: the . . • 
42To :Paul ... Bonoour11 s warning, the papal legat~ z,epli•d that oOlllllUltsm · ·. 
constituted. perhaps more Qt a threat to the ~rch in the Saar th.an .··. 
Nazisme · Though Paul-Boncour argued that.Montesqui,eu P8119'Y'8c.t :SJ(batW:ng 
mere than one enemy at a time, the Fnnch tailed to convinot Rqme that the 
Saar ahould constitute a sepaN.te 'bishcpnc, and the tegion.remdned.u.nder 
the intl'!l~e 0£ Ge!lllan b1shopsc .Jceeph Pa,4 .. Bonc~; ll,'h£! Ja!1. CJu,me~. (3 vols •. J New York, Cc 1946), III, .5,.6.,. · ,.,·. . · · 
4314 '.tPR•• Febl'ua.:t713.20, 1933, ses:1Jlto 44 :,., . '.,.':: 
Ibido, 1'ebNa:t7 1:3, 193:3, Po 4o 
~·· . " . 
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Neunki:rohen t'f'agedy' as a pr>®tood:,, Be:r.lin attempted to establish its basici 
claim to the region and obtain di.pl<ma.tte re©ogni ti~n of the fa©t., F@JJ> 
some wee..'ics the FJ/lench and the Ge~s Fival.led each ~th.er in their cut.., 
pourings of aid and sympathy w th.Ell dis~ster vi~tas .. F'Nme prciolaimed 
a :national day of :meu:ming and c@U;ected at lea.st 6ooflooo fl"ams for the 
survivors or the tll?agooy/11 The Fren~h won ac©laim also ~en they ~scued 
a. 't40ffian 'frffl.O had been oo:ned five days in the &bas~ Vi@e ... Cha.mello:r 
Franz von Pa.pen e,f Ge~i @n the@th.er hand, was given a eo@l reei<eption 
when he pers:cnally visited the disaster s:1:telll and hi~ press ©Clill'iterenee. was 
boycotted by many Saarla.nd repo~So Despite the aeute competitiOfiwbiCh 
the Neunki~hen d1 saster had i.nspired, V<l1n Pape>ll predicted t,mi.t .a settle"' 
ment with Franee might so@n be rea.())hed which would return the Sau to the 
Fatherlando46 
The Vioe-Chaneellor was probably re.fem.ng to a. temp@raey easing of 
' 
tension within t,he Disamament C@nference which had become a.ppu,ent ~rly 
in 19'.3'.3., But later in Febroa.ey, the Governing Commission produ.~ed its 
findings concerning ?lia.zi pa.ra...milita.ry- a,(lltivii:,:r in the Saar 111 am this dis ... 
cl.oS'lll"e seriously weakened the Reieh0 s posit,ion a.t Geneva.. For some time 
the:reafte:r, no prowc·tive disw.ssion was possible., 47 :n,. _ the'. l!l!!il~n:timet . 
other extremist a.et.ions e~ntinued to inflame Freneh public opirii~~; ·:rn 
. . . 
August:, German :nationals kidnapped two Frer!Ch subjeo'i:',s while on Saar 
temtory~ Both the British and the French p~tested, 'bu:t r>eceiv~ o~y . 
. ·. . ··48 
"arrogant replies•~ fr.om t.he Ger.'man Government. Id,ttle hope remained. for 
~ .. Ibidt1, Feb:t"l.uary 1.7, 19'33, p'11 8, and February 18, 19:3'.3 11 Pe 21> 
46 . l'.b1do 9 Feb~11ar;r 16, 1933, P• 2ff 
47:rtd.tt~ t li'ebmary 24, l9:3'.3i, Po l<> 
Ll8wambaugh~ §!.!t ~~ PP<I 125 ... 121; L~U.. ~, ml, Pl) 
161 ... 
poli~y was based upon ef:f~rt:itve di,samament ®.nd irtterrMai:t:,i©Jn~tl :s@lidarl.ty t 
that poli.©y was r111ined., 49 Hi.t:ler9 ho'i'!IWV®I~~ «-3ont;,ltl'll1~id ·loo va,11:dLlla.te be-
tween rattling the s,11,1,b~r tailid appF.:-'@.!l:it"i:r1g t.h® man @f' p~ee,, 1&1:ter in 
sime Ja.ma.ey1,1 meet p®i1"S©l'.fiW,1J.y t© d:.i:~eo:llss 'the slt,uat,i@n., Indieating ·that 
he had. :t>e:n©'Wil~ed all @3lad:ms t,© A1sa.e~L©1f:t>~in~:il Hit:le:!l"' fu'.f'th~:t> h@perd that 
~ F:ranic©""German e:nteri:te ©<Ei@.l.d be b!!>l..:s:~d @n ;r,ca.ttkl.©lh~n-ent. ©:t the Sa~-r,,,jO 
~'l«l~.ai~ 
16 f Hi tl.e:i:• lt"epl.ied r~assu.ringly t,hsd:, on~e 'the Sa-<'ill" qii1esti.©n 'li-1'~.s settled, 
Germ-any mu'.lld ,lltA'.N~~JJt .• the let,t;~r and spirit @f l;t'J@&m@~51 The th;r.,eat that 
German demands mu.st, be m 1t bef'ore an easing ©f tsnsi~ns e~uld be assumed 
was :i:mplieit i.n Hitleril}s sta:t.;em.e:ri:t~ but ,e;;eems to h.a:va been l@i:rt i'lJ:ti\. the 
Ft"ench;1 
Hitler made num.erou.s st.atement,s (d'. :th:b kind in the early ·thirties,; 
·
49:iDdouard. '.S:):nnetous: , 
(5 vol,s 11 ; 1:·a.1 .. ,l,s !) l.962) j v ~ :r~r::1~~ 
JOHi:tl,li:'l:t> al.s,, 1u.'f.l:m:\,1sed t.,~ l:.n.ti.ld a Rhi:r:ie 1m:i:m.mtent ci.omnemorating ~ej.:r,, 
pee.ore~ Gel((~~ss Bonnet.I!) ~ ~, $!!.2£.'!!-Z. .~!. ~m,! ~J!l!l~!!! !EttQ....,l221 (Faris, 196:Jlh p .. J..2a.. · . .. 
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In. an attempt to alleviate FJ.o~niah anxiety, he d~~la~cl on Nov~.mbe:r. 21 
that the ·saa.r was the s~le ~,ning Fr.ut©o..,Geman iecmt?=oversy9 52 and 
followed. his asserti@n nth co:n@Nte p~p!>salso In :r.ietum f@'.l" rattache .... 
~ bef'o~ 1935 and reei@gnit.i©ln ot ·the p.t'i:ncsipl9 of equality in a.ms foF 
Getmany9 Fra.me l'10l.'il.d be gra:n:ted ec@nmdel @on@~ssir0>ns in the ,Sa.a:ro The 
Fremh r.abinEft de®lmed this cvertill'.t.'e, t'ei~'.r,a,ti..:ng its posit;l@n that 
armaments ©ontl"©l. and the Mhi~vememt @f sew.ri ty must pt>~ede e:ny cthe 
B.v ~mbel"$ the :N.rst a1gns of' a sev\!JN inteifnill., @l"isis were. be.,. 
ginning to compli©ate the F"Nnch ~si:tion regarding Germa~., Neverlhe"" 
less, ~ Yo:xt_ ~!! c~nes:P@ndent FN<derick To. ~ha:lll __ :teporled from 
Pa~is that publi@ @pi.m.@n was slowly being wn t(:)I Jh>am@oe.G~ re"" 
ccndlia.ti@n,, A .few days l~t~, Hitler> sent anot.he:t-> pr<»p©sd whieh de ... 
wmded immediate ~~~!!f!o He st.i.ll insistied l@?i equali:ty, bu.t agreed 
to rencmnee offensive ~'P©lM and to a general and ~dp~al am.s c~ntrol 
through an eight to tan year oon ..... aggr~ssiolrol pa@to fl:le 11":reooh _ ®@:ntinued 
to tem.?»ri-Ze@ h~er~ and reje©ted this plan t>OJ@o5'.3 As g~ds f~r their 
refusal, the French Gov·er:tme2'!1.t, impli.ed that dire@t negctia:ti@:n.s 'With 
Germany ovet" ·the Saar 'W@uld unde~wt the teague 0 s a.dmi:nistmtion a:nd 
prestige and wuld 9.lltOOnt to an abandom.e:n.t of FH.n@e11 s @ommi tment to a 
Saa.r pleb:isc:1 t~" v.a th t.his stwleme.te0 19:33 (t.losed on the Saar disputeo 
ld.kewise, the las·t, hopes that Fr~e wou.1..d obtai:r1 las'ling be:ne:f':its frem 
the Saar o:rie,i t~4'lll' t.hs:t. m.atte:ri, t-h.e i~eaty o:f '\/e'rsail.1est1 disappea.redo For 
Deciembe!' 8~ 
~Ii December 
19.Jl+ ·wo·wLd ©pen wi'tb a. gT•air@ eon~rt'i'tutional. ~r.:i.s::ls :l:n :F'Nme l-mi~h left 
her impot«mt, for :a t.:lme in i:nt.,errnai;,c\oml affai.J.~.s., 
cHAmR nI 
PLEBISCITE PREPA:RATIONS, 1934 
'!be intend ttent P'r&not).Qe1'un nego·~ationa over the Saa:r td.l.ed or 
nob &ocompliabn.ent in 193'.3, ard m:Uei~ was unable to achieve ra.ttachellent 
wlthout a pl.eb1soiteo As a result, the League pl"OCeeded in 19'.34 with :1~ 
pre~at1ons tor the 19:35 voteo Diplomt.tioally, the situation wu zoela-,. 
" tiTely calm ea!"ly in the ye&ro a.man diplomat Richard von K.unlmann N-
tel".Nd. to the numerous "peaGe" speech•• Hitler ad• toward the end ot 
19:33, and •ph&1:l.1ed that. H:l. tler and t.he Gffllan people realised the ne-
oe111 ty tor peaoeu war wounds needed time to hNl., he said, and only a 
' 1 
rKnoo .. Qefflan n;e2mshs1n~ wculd atto!'d that time. SUbeequent events 
did not bear wt this tqpe of' optt.fld.lffl., howver, '1'he oontrc-,ersy O'ler 
the Saar TerTi tory made that area the tthot spot" of 1934 'Ni th rNnch, 
a.man, and League pres·Uge at stake. In the Saarland, the battle would 
rage around the wte fori 1...'t!.W.t 91.too Sl.noe many Saarlanders disliked 
National Socialism, :Franoe oiame tc believe they- '1f0uld favor a later 
plebiscite which ooul.d retum them to a Reich moN compatible with their 
ideas., Oemar,y9 cf cet1rse9 denied the poatib11:1.ty ct a second pleb:1.acite, 
implying that a vote for status 9!!.2. would mean an irTeCcverable loss of 
nationality to the Saarlanders under an international gov:e1"111lento The 
1tioha!d von ~, "The ~ture of the Saar," Foreign Affairs, 
XII (April, 1934), 426m4'.35o Von Kuhlmann served. as Counselor of the 
German Embassy, London, 1908=1914 and Seciretaey or State tor·1roJ."*1.gn 
.Attairs, 1917 ... 1918, du.ring whi~h time he negotiated the Brest-U.tovsk 
Treaty and the Peaoe "f Bttcha:resto 
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Iieag11u/' S p:Niibl• may bei SU~©imtly S'tatedo Its wt,y was tc~ i"ilt'St pl'@,z, 
vide f@r the pl.ebis©itej oot a.ls~ w W©:tk fo:t> Eu:oopean J.>ea©e; 2 sh~d a 
Saar S@l'ult,'.i©n be foond 't@ s~~ve b©th a:i:WiS!ii all tm bett.,e?'o Yet both 
Gemmy· aniil Fl"1U'1tC1 ei had i,na:~gut?'a'lt.ed pt'epi.:t>edness ©apaigm t and many 
feared that the Sul' ~1CJuld b~ the fa:t.a'JJ. spa:t"k t© wu) It was a ©@mplex, 
dif'fiwlt, and ei@ntintti.ng p·r.'@blem with wbi©h the :teagul.e had t~ deal, and 
the efforts t.o SIQllVe i:t stf'd:taed na:tl@n&l t®tl'J'.f)eil"Sio 
The firr:rt League ses:~.,(Q)n ©!"' 1934 @~1nil))tdl ©lll J~~ 1.5 in th~ l"®di.., 
zatl@n that its :m@s;t pl.l:'essi.ng qll~st.i@n ws the Saar pl®bi.s©iu»o Ge:manyr, 
of ©O~se 9 was :oo·t, pt>es<!illrtt. at, this m.eeting i havlng ea:r>lie:t> wi thd?"awn, al"" 
th@ugh she wuld retain 'oo,th. l,eagile membe1f"sbip and a Cfflimil s®at tor tw 
m®lre ye&rs .. 4 J!i'~m~!) r:1'S1,fffl~ibly f'~ a \ltl:S~in$@ @f l.@ya.lt.y and fail¥:' plays," 
asked that ~'il?mny b~ e1~ressl.y n©:tif'led t0:f t.hei impendlng Saar talkso 
M~t>e a@©U.riat~y~ Fnn(~,e, p1r>©bably· desiNd G6'Jrmany11 s ~">eMe s@ that the 
la.t·te:t> 'W!Uld have l®ss (clause f@l' s01bsequent @©.--mplaints.., At my rate, 
Fran~~ made ·this ©@n~il:la:oowy gestuN and '.ttall.:y t t@ was l"appcrl~ull." @f 
:the Saa:ti quesrt:ioin, fot"Waro~rl the J/':f.'@.'JD©h message" 5 The German I"eply was 
immedi.&te and bNs~:1,ueo Th@'h' n.®rte ©it 'th.e f@l.J,©wing day stated that ''fo'l' 
reasons or p,1".in@i ple 9 /Jie'r'manr,7 mu.st abstain f'?>©m taking part in the 
discrussiono '' Frar10e was willing enoo.gh t!Ol delay the ·taJ.k:s pending the 
Geman appeia.·ra.n©~i) 'but,;, ~:run,y bl11ntly r,ie:f\u;edo Sti.11. 19 Ge:tmaey Nalized 
that France was ·anwil.ling 'to neg<01ti.a·t;a away thfi plebis~i.te iusmi@h as 
2bJ!! ~ !!!!~,!! J8l'l\1Wl.'ey' 14il 1.934~ S~o l'V t Po 1,., 
)lbidi!I ~ May 2'7"' 193,£11,, $/el@., IV'" p"' l(I 
111-t•guEt ot Nat-t.cns:, Ihtt ~~nJ:~l.i, 
tIV' (,Ja.n~ar,yf, 1934)1! 8c, Her:·id,n.!i.f'tel'l CJ 
§m!!'.fla 
5New 'Y'.cJti>k "il;'lmes 00 Jan'IU\'t.""lf' 1.6 ,. l.9)'1-·.. \h l,2o UQ..lrlli!'lfl1.\ ~--.-i ~~)Jlll"M,'llQI tT i'fl ·111 S' 
it W!Ulil give the S.a.a:rl.and~iit'."S the @pp@:r>t1llni ty 'loo, w:l@lfjj the-1.r @plni@ns,, 
Cons~@ntly9 Gem.my inf'erit'mlE.ld t,h~ l.eagit)l.e that it p1!:"ef'e:rl'."$d. t~he earli.est 
p©Jss:lht~ pleblscite date<> 6 The G~~n G,ffl!ll'ment, sisi~d a li'tt.11.s feari"llu 
that Saal'' ©pln:ion was mt &s ~rt1-•@ng f.@r· !:~ i.n 1.9)4 as it ha©! 
been befo1No 1'hi:1s !i' the S((}1@ner the pleb1a:@:\l;te9 the fewr adh~rmts 
On. Jarmaey 19 9 th~ f:i1"!rlt '.imp:llt't:.;~nt ©i:f'f1.~:id. di1;1cussi@ns ~f the Saar 
pl"@bleo w~l'® held$ ~n<d th.e fi.lfs·t i?ll'-'Ulle)@=:srl.ti.sh d.:lspi.,tt® @'1/($1'.f' t.Jh.e queisti(.)n 
arose.. Paul .. ,PA'iln~our. i~quested tha 1'., the C:©!i!U'!©iil d:itseiussi@ns be se@re't s@ 
that the pi·©i'tiJLem.si Ylrl.ght bf9 m©>'r'e f.1tlly- a.nal.yz®d.. Sir J~hn Sim,,n, repN"" 
sen-ting G·r._t Bil.'':Ua:tr.1f1 d:lisag:r.•@ed; he wni;~d @p1en ses~iliilns and a minimm 
Frenchm&m argued t,ha t ·the C-e~1'!l?l!a.:n fd .. de ©i:f the ~~(lles:t:,.ei,n :s:hwld be Ml..y 
ai:t>ed so that (;\)bse'.U:'"!te,~s ti1)t11l.,1Jl 9:pip;r~~J.i.at,e tJr.~ f'.a~1l:ts and irregu.la'.ll?l:t:i.es 
of t.he Nazi reg.i..me., "th-a B'10:U·:h1h f'*Mt'ietil t.b:b woo.ld 'be of''t'emd.ve tC11 
(~many· and r~.,.•the:r ;b1pid.1r• c.ha.r)k~E:is f«:i:r dl:b1a:r1m:11.1111(!1nt,.. Wl.th t,hi.s a.1°gument~ 
B1.~1U.sh m~de,~t1~n p.1"ev:ed\lred~ 1 
The next ~est,lon i.nvol·\l·e,d ·the pleb1.s~i:tti a'.f)AJ,pg~m~tf.l t,h-selveis •• 
Fra:Me held that tshe :ties:ul .. ts ot 'the pl~bistd1.t.e wuld be m@N valid if 
t.he l.eague gu.a1·•mteedi Saad.~:r1derr· r.,ights b©J't.h i!iJu.wlng al'lld att~r. the actua!L 
vo·t,SJ. Ot.he'F.ri.se, Na~:lt i..ntim:1.dt\li.t:i©n and thr,ed:s ©':f l'®prl:sus ©{;l)\il~ eril1.!t.y 
the ball~t:ing., The Leag,t:1® decided in fav©'f.' of' the J;"'J"e:n©h 8.'t>gWlil.ellt, brt 
61'.b:id.,, and JllD:!J,llJ:f'Y 14, 193£4·, se©e. I'!/ 11 p., l; ~. ~ .~D!, 
~!lY!k .~euzli xrv < ..r,1nu@.1:-,,, ~ 193.ti,) l! a,, 
7 Jell?W~, m•1 1he F~l"~,tgn Ji\-;,l:i,((Sy rg£ lLt1Ui@ Barth(iJ1tll. 11 " pft.,, 439-4l!t0e 
't,o;1i S~Ji:'!l't~ t'®! the s,e)tn?f,!J-tty 91 t.ind t,:rrus'bi'lfJJiF.'t,hine:ss @f' 
'i,f©•ti:i1g ~ ® ., 11> 
(a) v, S'tUrt!,V :m,easut•{'liJ: r1,1ilet:.tl!a.ti;etd ens~.:ri:·~ by all .. @l.ppl"@= 
1pr'1at~ mENlil?,ts the t'1sgI~lf:i,5r~tty (Qlf' the ~~'.l<Btit;,©:t'ail p:t"Dl~eeid:lngs; 
(b) 'tA:l! bike par,t11.Yo1JL~w~ly ltttct~ ,(;ll(11riisd,1de1t•,l[!,till'.Yn the sbidy 
th~, ~ppt"t1rp1:>ia1.te means s@l.:f eg51:l1.~ll:01.dl:rng tJ'll@!J pc11pul.a:t:it,@n 
~gatnst :r>ir•es:su'.'.l:•e ad'' $1,'.fiy a:tiN:l t.he <50Ce1~u:fdt©n ©•.f any 
th:r·Ee).~t::; likely ·the trills:'lt11Jr"©rlhineiss @f the 'W@1t,i.ng; 
'i "''<t·~s,,;Iu "'il'i''" ,,:i,,"O'';t'l'<"""''\f'·i: 1f":'!'1::~ ?",'""Ir 't.,,,,,, ;,,,~·,hmA\ ·11':'*''·""'.,jj 1c"' 11'. "",·w 0, &:> ,.;·iw,i..i\y G .. .l'.,Y' ·u,\::;,1.4::i.;:;."il;;;i,;;p \1.,,,.fu·W,.1,h..,.., ,,,~&-o,.y' Q • .;,:i.;;; ,.;;.,,~~~:>~Jb!&- ... ")~~1Wl \.11"':.P '-·~· I~ t,,,\; 
the G,J~~'T-'lilin.g G1.Y1Jmds®:i~,::!l'lL ~si ]:"~gards: f~h~ i~.a:ln't,enan©e @!' ©l:il:·11~:if 
ri.g th® ~b:l:s:10:it@i •. 9 
'.~''.luu:i ,!j!J)d the ,r2ri,.rml'ng ele1;r!.:.J,m. "~ls5)Ultj n1l:ii·t be hel.«51 
tJ1l\\'> «:\~: t··•J<·1 l"' ,,,, .• ,.. .,,,, .. .,.,,,,.,,.~ :~fi' 10 
v.,;,.~I· ,I" ~'l;ii, ;.1.JLr,1,,'I,& r:""i.<g,v_.·o,Jb.h .r,lili!i 
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li'rren©b ©:if li'?'@n@h,~,influeooed ·tr~ps. · GeI'ltflaey- t..b.en 'W'lli.l.a.te:r>all:y r,quested 
Spain w supply su.@b U¥Jlcps,, lf &'i)a:i.n complied, :n.@ a~tion by the Council 
l:.ffZQ1\l!l.d be. ne@essaey :.i ;yet the ]ague would be pleased that the need :r~r 
· pf)l!ieJe had been sat,isfiedo Spain, h©wever,,, r>etl.u!ied. the Ge:r.-m.an request 
la.ter the same monthl!lll 
As the Cemitt.ee 11:l•f' 1~h~e 'began it,s sear.i@h fc.Mr an adequate Saar s©J.., 
l~:t:lon, ·the Si:x.tJ:1 o:t Febroa.ry t'eV(l)lt i.n F.taris f"«:iY!E•roed a ci@mrru.si vs ~mmge 
in Fxt>~n~h politi.ies.. On the heels @f the St.avlsky scandal, Pa.rlsian mbs 
maNb.ed ~,n Parl.iaent, and cibtained '.!!11~©'lU1?i.d Daladier.•11 s resigut:l.<i!il'!i. of ·the 
premlersh.ipo arhe rea@·ti.e:n ·oo ·t,b-, Stavisky affair was similar" t@ ·the 
YJ.t'ey.f'i11s ifll.nd &ul.a:r,ge:ta @a:ses i.n ·ij~ha't, :1.t shook: t,he 1.-'@~·ts o:f 1--epubuli<lllam.sm11 
f,\,s((;Ji.sm. pr>t>babl.y nel'Ve>lf:I' l!!!ame a.s elo.se to 't'.r-iumph in !1'1,an«;1e as· it did 1.n 
J·'eb'.f1ita:l!'y ~ 19:)ii,i 12 The C:hanibcft> ot t)e~t.:!.es :remd.ned oriented tt)ws.f\d t.he 
'.l:ref't,g but 'the ~,i'r.'l~'ttffl!.d.!!Ln~es f.avo:rc,~cl a citi'Jl:nse:r,va't:.h·e @?' ev·en ::-ea.fill'M,@naey 
l:Jlr?.iivlill·l':ti:mi:11ti:n-t.. ,J'iean tci1u~1s Bar.•thouj) a f'iii:tv-ae.ll:• pN~,el' and el.cse associat,e @t 
lt~Yi:rnittt'!."'9 tJlrttll.!i ,1@•.r.114~·1:ll.ed 't~JI ·t;he Qli.ai. ~i 00?11111y·o B1nrlt:hm1°1 anti .... G(rman selll't.1,,., 
menh11 dest.:t'oyed t.be ffl(ll<e\e:r.a.tl\.~n cif.' :~11.12'.ll.lll)'BCln(C1W:t1 a:nd i.nau.gu:v.rated a '"ha'.ll.°d. 
li.ne 111 i;A)w.1.•d Oref.l!l'Jan:,.i Ci'.,nM.:rmi it.y o:f' p@l:l@y was tbe:t"eby inte'fll:li!Jlt.edf . aJ,.., 
Ui@u.gh 'th:is ns n.ct app.a·r-ei,rt in the :tirst. months '1P.f' 19'.34~· 
Up@n tak.'i.ng ('jf"f'icet Barthou :lmmedi.a.tely taokl.ed the disarm.ment 
pr'O>blem,1 Th.e l.eag·ut, r:ont.bimed :lt.s discrl/lssions <i:»n the ways and means \Olf 
persuading Germany ,to @O©>per-a:t.e with the Con:fet"en(.i)eo Tei encoonge this 
eo~per.~-tl.on9 Barthou agt?eed t~ a©©ept Hitl.e:r,0 s latest disa:rmam.ent pr¢.'!>p>sal 
blll.t was @ve~ed by Taroieu and Rerrl.~t who teal"ed that this plan would 
11:tbi,d., ~ :Feibroiru<y l.'1111 1934~ p,. 3; ~ ~ ~...!tt~ 
XIV O'eb:tlla:t'Y\, 193li}, 30,,..31; B.m! J,2r,1;i ~' Febru.taey 25, 1934, p .. 2'7,, 
. . l2Etl@ua.t.~ He1Tlot, ''The F'1t,'ilre @f French Dem«il©l:r'ii.'m:r11 H ~mm~' 
n1 ( Jruy 11 193it) ~ 6Q,4..,6Q9.., 
p~:r:t1d.t, li·l'l'd ted Ge'.!fllMU'l t'e1ID1.:.:m~m.el'ntj) '.f'h~ F:lfemb Ji"~:t·eign Minis·t,er ·t,,hen 
te:n,j®.i:r~f.l hls reslgns:l::,i~1n air!d. t.:mly :ira'fllli.:tned l:n ©i:f:N.~e ·t,h:rough tJi:'iie per.,,. 
sma.sil{lln o,f l'l11r,mrl.e·t' G$.st,!'jln :il);\lU!ijErit•gi.11.<f!'l., 1l1hl.s i~oh li.ne ·tow.rd di.sall!'.!Hment 
y1..elded 't:ffl:il ,:mp@rt.an'f:;, t'e$ultsi the l.,,ea.gue refused Ritl.el·''s rei.q1tU\lS1t f~r 
13!.mi. ted ?'aan11am.ent arM:i. thus pa:·1red ·the we:y :f'o11· a f'ull ... sot;'le . a.:t.r11.a~eW1ts :ra©e; 
tfJl J'l,:v1 inrl de !,!j!tttf,1, &i.:r•t..h~x\lJt d:jl '.i'."e~ted hi.s main ei'foit,s t@ the a t.tai:nment. 
of' a.no'l:.he:r. l,(Jl«:iamrJ 1~ ttd s t:lme t,€jl p~t~©'t the f~,ntteros ot Easl'term 
!~.wpe"l:3 
lNtt·n.e d'\~a.1~.,ll'l.mei'.nt. 1r1~nmi®.lned a :JLea~:i,:ng pirob'll.,m!l ·the Sa1&r,i @@ntN1re:t"sy·. 
awa.it1::.1id so:blJ't:·t{m~ ".!('he O"mm.li.'·t:tee ©f' '!'h-N1e ~~~·~'t;t:ni11ed i.t,s Wf.'k thfl'§lugh the 
spwlng monthus, brt ll1:.t:U.e was J1:ij.bl.:bhed @'f' :i.te a·:ort,ivit'.1.@I~ s~~l!i!I the 
r.e~glll!IP c~:m:1rncll had !91,r)J,i~,~.irr1vt:11ti e;,1l;"!t.lit!ll!'',~ Mo:g,ol!!il disC'IIJ1 . .ss:io:rw ·t:otCllt plai.~e Clt'P:n ... 
eet'frlng ·thf.'! m.f.MU'AS :t'@:t.' f):bta1~nt:ng 1& ta:i~ a.nd reip,'t'4!!ltH1.rutati:we plel:d.,s~~:te" :t·t. 
w~.s m 1·~ •• ed S1j>Vi!i1lNl f.1:.m~t; t.ha:t Naz.l ,1~-t:ivity :ln the Saa:r,· mad~ thi.s goal 
dH'!':lciai.lt.~ la M,a·pi~h.11 t-he O@t'Yn!lltU,t,ee ~:o~~ltlest.«.,d a Oons·ml:tat'.l@n trt Jurierts 
,1,biCJh t.hen :«~51de lega.l.:isrtlfil :r'G·conmi.¥.Jt~1ina.ti.©1l'hfJ:1, '.l1he COllllll'llrittae suggested in 
t,h@ f'ili1l.low.i.ng vi@n.th u,a11 .. a pl~bis(9l°t,e ~omm.iss:lon, undew,t.ake t.;o assu~ t:.he 
'l:®eih:rrt.oa'l Ufpe1t\t.s ©it ·the pleibls~i.te and thd, an !1 h.22. CM:'~'l'.1l'°t. be. li,kewise 
esb.blishecl- Othet" 'thpi©s d~1.i!Jl.lt, ·vlt,h f'lfl!anees, wt.er :ir•egi.strat:!,'1)n,, ·wting 
Jf1:t·eeinrtt,s \I) the :meth©>d by wbi,©h the vo·tin.g results wer'e t(O) be ©©nsideNid9 
a~d gene1•.itl q~est~iJ:l'M ©,f the JJlffibisc:ifa.,es adm.i.nist.r-ation~14 Jl'inally, ·the 
C@mm.ituie, re©e-lved anoth~l' ,rep~rt. f'r>c~m Chaiman I('n©ix to the ~ffect t,hat 
the 11!!'!!s~..!~. ws ~©tntinu:ing its ar.iti:vity11 and ·that,, ~s a result cf' 
·this agitati~n, the authent,lelty <o\f the plebised,te may be comp:romised. 
''.!"he (~©m~d.tt.ee ·then @.dj011.1:,1necl wl th its weighty problems and set its 
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reconvention a few days p?'io~ to the next session of the Coun@il on May 
14,,15 
The Committee of 'rhree8 s beginning was auspicious, but many of the 
major sa.ar probla11s could be solved only thr>ough Fr~co~(.'ierman agret1JMentso 
The League Council rieceived the Committee6s report in mid ... May and aci ... 
col"dingly authorlzed the est abl:lshmen't of a Plebiscite Commission and a 
F.lebisoite T:r1bunal to aid the Governing Commissi~n in the conduction of 
the votingo Fttr>therj the Council decided that those persons who were 
pennanent :r·esidents of the Saar Territory as of June 28• 1919, and had 
reached the age of twenty would be consideNd qualified electors., No one 
else was to be so designatedo Questions concerning the manner in which 
the vote would be considered wers :riefeued to a late!" meeting, although 
voting by districts was asSUJ11ed acceptable .. This caused _Ge~ny some 
anxious moments; should one or more distrlot vote against ~,ch.pent, 
it might be detached from the Territory and thus from the Reioh., The 
tickl1.sh pt11oblems or se0"11ring a tree vote and or maintaining ol'der were 
also r,efer>red to a later sessionj as was the question of t'inanoese16 still 
vitally concerned with the problem of order, the Governing Commission re,.. 
ported to the League Council that "a part ot the pop11lat1on no longer had 
any confidence in the impart.iality and eqw.ty of the local trlbv.nalso" 
Th.is was a consequ.enoe or the ef'teots ot National SocialiSlll on the Saar 
and on Germany, but the Commission p:roposed no adequate measure to remedy 
the situationol? 
-
1190 
l5Ibid.,, 84; ~ ~ :§mes, April 14, 1934, Po 8., 
l6r..eague £!. Nations Monthly ~:ey;. XIV (April, 1934), 120., 
17Ibido 1 "Fifty-seventh Report cf the Saar Govel"?ling Commission," Po 
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The month or May seethed with unsettling conditions in the Saar 
which ren~ted on the plebiscite prepa:r>at:ions., . Goebbels ma.de a vigorous 
speech on t...b.e sixth, and its a.f'te:rmath caused Chai~n Knox t,c fear ~ 
coup 2!, mai!! by Germany o Shorlly thel"ea.fter, French troops began move ... 
ments on the Saar border,, which resulted in heightening German anxiety 
although France denied that these maneuvers had any signif'iea~e. On the 
twenty ... fourlh~ the French state Mlnes Admini.str.ation reported the theft 
or some documents., Geman agents wer>e naturally suspected ot the deed in 
an effort to obtain lists of those ~arlande:r chUdrtln who attended ;the 
French schcolso18 
The si.tuaticn was similar.•ly tense in France. On the day of Goebbel us 
speech, Depaty Andr.•t Fri.bourg, in his capacity as vioe ... cha:Lrma.n of the 
f'oreign affairs commiss:l.on of the Chambe'l" of Deputies, commented on the 
French positio~. Besides prcelaming the desirability of political, eco-
nom:io, social and rel.1gi.cus freedoms in the Temtory', he argued that a 
vote for ra :t.ac:ihement would W.Nak economic disaster on the Saarlanders,, 
-----
. am certain {fieputy F'l'ibou:rg eontirme{! that the majority 
will declar( rn tavo:r. of' the status quo next year, bJ.t it 
should be properly understood tha't. if' peradventure the 
tern t.017 of the Saar i s returned to Germany and that if we 
must give up the mines or property of the state or of French 
private ownership we shall demand, as is our strict right, 
payment in cash.i9 
This was a propaganda piece, certainly, but also a threat inasmuch as 
Germany was ill prepared to pay t"o:r the mines in gold, the real meaning 
of Frlbo rg's "cash." 
Barthou0s position was similar as French policy perceptibly stiffened., 
18New ~ Time~, May 7, 1934, p .. 9, May 9, 1934, p. 3, May 1.7,''1~, 
p., 13, and May 25,1934, Po 11., 
19Ibide, May 7, 1934, p. 9. 
Addl"essing the Chamber on May 25, he stated categorically that t here would 
be no negotiation concerning the plebiscite and went further tban Paul~ 
Boncour by refusing to offer even the hint _of an oliv~ .b~{l~ch to ~rmany. 
All peoples in the Saar, he said, whether they were eligible voters or 
not, must be accorded theil" rights and freedoms so that they might ex ... 
press them.selves openly., In a rare moment of agreement, the Chamber rose 
almost to a man..,.., Right, Center, Left, and Extreme Left.., ... to applaud., 20 
In contrast to Fribourg, however, Bart,hou made it clear that trade and 
customs agreements were more important than a cash settlement over the 
Saal". His central policy was to support the Versailles Treaty fully, yet 
he was mere concerned with achieving disamament than with any ether 
question. In desiring Gemany0 s return to the disamaent table, Barthou 
seemed relatively moderate in his approach and consistent with Paulo 
Boncour•s earlier attempts,,21 
Moderation did not characterize the saar negotiations, however, as 
tension heightened to a tfl'ler pitch. In a wise move, the League Council 
aoted in late May to suspend its discussion ot the plebiscite tor ten 
days. Tension subsided temporarily and optimism even came to be voiced. 
One writer expressed the opinion that the "Saar problem. will be settled, 
.. oand w.1 th .good faith on all sides one old sore between France and Gemany 
will ha"{e been healed."22 By June, the major Franco .. Qeman disputes were 
set tled, but the preparations by the League still remained far> f rom com-
plete. 
The relative quietude or the concerned l)Owers allowed the Committee 
20Bonnerous, Histoire Politigu!• v, 248 ... 249. 
21Ib1d.,, 247 .. 251; !!X I2Zt Times, May 31, 1934, p. 11. 
22Frederick T. Birchall in~~ T.Lmes, May 31, 1934, p., U. 
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of Three to take ma,jor strides in it,s plebiscite provisionso On June 4, 
Baron Aloisi presented a final report to the League Council in which he 
enumerated the governing principles of the plebiscite: that the Treaty 
of Versailles sho~d be followed both in letter and spirit; t hat the 
prestige of the Council rest on the f airness of the voting; that an iJll... 
provement of Franco-German relations be consideredo23 
To facilitate matters, Aloisi asked that the French and German 
GovefflDlents state their support for the goal of providing a free voteo 
In reply, he received on June 2 identical notes which resolved that 
the French and German Goverments, without prejudice to 
the provisions of paragraph 39 of the Annex to Article 
50 ot the Treaty of Versailles, undertook: 
(a) to abstain from pressure of any kind, whether 
direct or indirect, likely to affect the freedom and 
trustworthiness of the voting; 
(b) likewise to abstain frcm taking any proceedings 
or making any reprisals or discrimination against persons 
having the right to vote, as a resu;Lt of their political 
attitude during the administration by the League ot 
Nations; 
(c) to take the necessary steps to prevent or 
punish an:, action by their nationals contrary to these 
undertakings.24 
Oeman;r agreed to this statement of guarantees in negotiations with :rrance 
over the proposed date of the plebiscite. In return, France pendtted an 
early vote, which was set tor &mda:,, January l'.3, 19350 
In this June session, the League Council turther charged the Plebi-
scite Ccmmission with the actual administflltion of the plebiscite and gave 
it the ?'1ght to decree appropriate ordinances.25 The Council likewise 
23teague or Nations Monthly sumar;y, XIV (June, 1934), 136. 
24Ibid., P• 1370 
25This Commission had actually been selected in early May and com-
prised three members plus a technical expert. Miss Sarah Wa.m.baugh, author 
or§!.!!:. Plebiscite, was the expert, or techni.cal advisor. 
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followed other Committee of' Three suggestions . oonoerning voting by 
districts, the establishment of .a supreme Plebiscite Tribunal and eight 
inferior courts, and attendant judicial problemso The Pl.ebisoite Com.,. 
mission was to function for one year after .the vo~ng so that alleg~ ir-
regularities might have a chance f'or redresso On the problem of maintains 
ing order, the Council was not too suocesstu.l in its deliberations and 
provided for only an increase in the local gendarmerieo Financing, how= 
ever, was settledo The League was to pay $50,000 f'or the plebiscite, 
with France and Gemany each contributing $250,000026 This last settJ.e-
ment particularly pleased Germany since she would have as great a hand 
in the plebiscite as Franceo Since the French were well satisfied with 
t .he other Council provisions, one might think another "era of good 
feelings" would. be in store. Ba.l"thou, however, reiterated the _serious ... 
ness and necessity for maintaining order and insuring political. and other 
freedmso 27 He evidently distrusted the Germans, and with good cause; 
Nad intransigence toward the Versaii+es tems was already appare~to 
Although the League Council was making progress in its attempt to 
provide a "secret and trustwol"thy" plebiscite in :run acco~ _with Wilson's 
1919 stand at ~l"is, its ettorts to provid• for!)!~~ peaqe were less 
truittul. Gel'lll.ll\Y was too conoerned over this strategic border area to 
~ow the League• tree hand in the situ.ation by m.odert.ting her campaign. 
H1tle:ri se•ed nervous and tearful that National Socialist actions would 
alienate Saar opiniono Yet his Na.111 ideology did not admit of failure in 
this German areao After all, the Saar Ba.sin was the only Ge~nhab1ted 
26teague g,t Nations Monthly &namaty, XIV ( June, 1934), 138-139; .!'.!! 
!.2l:!s, Times, June 2, 1934, P• 9, and June 3, 1934, p. 28. 
27League g! Nations Monthly SUmmar,:, XIV (June, 1934), 138-1390 
\ 
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territory which Hitler could add to the Reich at this time wi'thout re-, 
sorting to force or arms. This plebisci.te, he perhaps thought, must be-,. 
come the first victoey of the .Third Reich.28 
To retain the support of the Saarlanders and ward off a possible re~ 
action to Nazi ta~ti cs, Hitler decided in 1934 that some moderation 111Ust 
be at least expressed i ,n the Terrl.toey. Maintaining the "peace front 11 
previously put f'orthp Germany had disavowed in early Febl"!lary any intent 
to influence the plebiscite. She then ordered that all overt Nazi 
campaigning stop, probably a propaganda move in itselr.29 A month l ater, 
Nazi tactics did seem more moderate and the young firebrand, Alois Spaniol, 
was removed f'rom his position as leader of' the Deutsche Front. Spaniol 
had been extremely vitriolic in pursuing his campaign, particularly against 
catholics. In calling for their mur>der, he referioed to them as "torturers 
of the soul of German chilchoen. ,,JO Jakob Pirl"O, a Catholic, replaced him 
and jo~ed the Saar National Socialist party with the J2!Utsc1J.! Front. 
later, PirJ"O began another intensive propaganda campaign to help achieve 
the German goal, of a ninety.two per cent vote for rattachement . The 
D!U~!£b.! F~ont even guaranteed that its members would hence.fort~ refrain 
from violence, yet the same day Saar Jews asked that their rights be pro-
tected should the League regime end. Apparently, Na11i exuberance could 
not or would not be quelled. DeJ: [s_rmer, a Germ.an weekly, went so tar 
as to claim that Mise Vtllmbaugh, technioal adviE·er to the Plebiscite com. 
mission and an American Protestant, was a Jew. Further, the entire 
28!!! Xofk ~; July 25, 1934; P• '.); Edouard Herriot, Jt.di,!t po t1nt1, gue!'N _ l autre ('.3 vols. a Paris, 1952), II, 442, 452. 
29Jones, ttthe Foreign Pol:i,cy of Louis Barthou," p. 44). 
,olbid., P• 445; W&mbaugh, ~ Plebiscite, p. 151. 
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Co:mmissi<m was reviled as a Jewish conspiracy~ 31 
Nazi. acts gave the lie to mere erto:tement.s and 0 gua·i•an·tees rt by 
Gemany, and the we11 ... 1nf'ormed Saar pop'Ul&(:)f.!t :reoognized ·this" Seve'.t"al 
event.:s in July were espe1.:Jiall . y hard f.'¢l'" ·t.he Gemans to explain" On t,he 
twenty ... fourt.h a:n aM~em.pt was made t.o assassl,nate the Saa:f'b:roe~ken police 
commissione1• who ha.cl :Y.\t:tcled neu.tslllhe ltreint. headl'JUarte:rs under Ctove·mi.:ng 
......wt!A._llijjl,~ C$J!Mld\~J , ' 
i.:ommi.ssion ot-rlers. 1~e (Jerman press had p:1llori.ed 'the eomiss:5wneri as a 
French dupet yet wa.s IIU:i,ck to disolai:m :responsib::tlit,y tor the deed,t Like .... 
wise; the Na.zi. :pu:r·ge it1 ,June a:nd the fX}llfuss assa.ssi:naticJn in ~luly did 
not et1hance the Ifa.tiona.1 Soci.alist :imagei,.32 Sooialtst. Max ~aun then 
brought. forth . e"'.riden~e that ap:pl'.'c)tl"l!at.ely 1.5 .1000 young Saar> Nazis, led 
by the :l:"enegade Span:io·l, were bei.ng 'i..:t1ained in German labor :(!~l'Tilps to take 
pa.rt in a Saa:r, :revo,lto Braun fel·t that H.itle:t• actually ±"ea.red defeat in 
the plebiscite and was theref'o:re Wt'·ki.ng t..o :in~ite a p:i?o..,,(.:e:rman uprising.~ 
Braun himself' had helped foster the German fear by leatti.ng a I"erp©irted 
70,000 Saarlanders on August 26 in a pledge to vote against Gemany.3.3 
Mevertheless~ hope:t"ul signs appea:lt'ed f':t'om time to time, as when 
!franee repor,tedly obt.a.ined a Reich guarantee that Saar minority rights 
would be protected af"ter 1935 and that the 1,eague could continue its 
regi.'11.e i'or three years mo?e~ This tull:'ned out to be just a. 11~0?'~ but 
the feelin,'s prevai.led that Germany was nearing concessions on Socialist, 
Jewish, and pro ... French Saarlander· minorities by p:t'oscribing any subse"" 
31New York Times. May 8, l9'.34i p" 1.5; May 15, 19}4, P• 1211 and July 
2s 19:34;-p. -z:- ·---
321bid., July 25, 19:34; P~· '1; J,mes, Hfhe F'oreign Policy of Louis 
Barthou:J n pp~ 464=465. 
:33.N!;! ~ lam!:t, August 30,. 1931+, p., ll, and August 27, 1934, Pe 1., 
Slf. 
. ,·:.'.:···:,.::::··.,·_. I 
June, and France was.satisfied fop the momenta W:ith tht_Franco,.,Qerman/ 
. accord ove:r the conditions, guarantees, and date of the plebiscite, ~rld 
· order" was again emphasized, and Barthou was refened. to as a ''di~tor." 
.ot satisfactory solutions in both the Saa:r> and the c:li.samament ~s.,34 
, 
Quiet reigned in the Franc0=oGe:rma.n relations tor a short tble, but 
.· . ' ..... 
w1 thin two months the propaganda wheels began turning once -~· ..,... slowly 
on the French side, turiousl;r on the Geman~ In late August,. 'the French 
. ~ . 
. "' Goverment sent a coJlllllUnique to its prefectures urging all qualified 
, 
e];eotors to vote in the saar plebisoiteo Frame realized.that her glo1"1 
~ . . 
could. be scmewhat dimmed by an urd"avoable vote and that :ae:rmans, might re.,,. 
'! • • 
ceive a tram~ ideolo~cal and patriotic boostf~ ito Yet the Pre>l1Ch 
. "' were again late in their appeal as they issued the comanmique c>nl.7 a w,ek 
before Saar voter registration closedo t1,iofflotal lll&nites~t.ions of French 
displeasure appeared as the press lambasted Hitler,· espeo:l.ally bera:ti-. his 
ins:1.ncerit;vo .Sevenl Par.ls papers even urged th~t the tavlts.··ot 13.riancl:9 1 
' . 
conciliator, policy- be repaired to stop the spread of pan-Gemaniam and. 
prevent ~r; they- thereby- intimated. that Franco ... Qeman negot~at1ons ahou:l~ 
be continued, but in a oautious manner/'5 One unnamed French official d8m 
olahd. ~~,!' :that tb.e '. ~:r was not a ~o-a.~ prol4:em\si-~: th•.· .· . . :·, ' . 
·_,-: .> .. >.. :I . _: ·: ).·:.'' ~ .. :·:~.·.:·(.;,1.':;, ;</>_:,:.\.'.,_ ' .· ... ;, .... :· > ·:·· .. ;:.I:.>;-;::,:, . .-·i,; (:.::·,· ... ::-.::.:.:<·'\: ...... :.·;.'·.: ··.:···.t ...... :<:-".. <:<,_ ........ :< .. _'. . ;(:i". ·,' :~.>/-.:):_:y:._:,.;\,:,i\L.?/:.:.:'./··>>·<:: . ., .. ' ,./ 
plebiscite did. not involve direct Frerich action~ Yet tbe ."8nc~i:, ... eQ~~c ··. 
intensts at stake in· the Saarland, he'warned;· could prevent.a peaceM 
... 
Francc-Geman Nlatlo:nship in case ot N:ttaohemento Moreover, Nazi .tenor. 
ism and ant.1....0atholicism pNOludad any satistaoti•n in Hitler's spoken 
11gu.aranteeso"'6 
. 34:tbido, May :30, 19:,4, p.o 10, May- 31, 1934, Po U, and June '..h 1934, 
Pe 28.. ·· · 
)SJ.'bido, August 22, 1934, P!·7, and .A.up.at 28, 1934, Po 6; 
'6::tbido, April 28, 1934,'po, 60 
.1 
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Germany was not so quiescent as her neighbor and took extensive 
measures to insure rattachemento For example, the Deutsche Front otfeNd_ .. 
to pay the expenses of to~er Saarland•rs to retum and vote in the pleb:l, ... 
scite .. In New York, a v,mn !!£. Saarlaender was set up fer this purpose, 
while the Geiman Goverment instituted a People's League for Gemanism 
. . ' 
Abroado In his harangue of May 30, Vice,.,Chancellor von Papen had 
threatened the Saarlanders with economic min should Gel'lW'ly' not gain a 
substantial victory. And in late August Hitler traveled tc Ccblenz to 
initiate a drive for German votes. At this demonstration, FJitler as 
usual stressed the patriotic plea and. waffled France to expect an over-
whelming Gel'lll&n victory~:37 
Hitler's words did not long dominate diplomacy over the Saaro On 
August '.31, Barthou made his p!"inciple statement et French policy on the 
Saar question in the f'crm of a memorandum to the Prench Cabineto The 
! . 
Government approved this aide..memoitth then sent it to the League Council 
for its action. Bat'theu asserted that French interests must be proteeted. 
in the Saar regardless ot the plebisoi te.9 s outcomeo . To achieve this, he 
argued that certain political, juridical, and tinanot-3. problems mu.at 'be 
· IQ1Ved before~and~. .· Sh01J.l.cl. Germany ~dS.,t~ ~,Upy'. tfl• . ~~r·:jJjon :,a: ·. . ... 
, ·. · . · .,' ., .\' ·?'·, <: · ·. · .. : \.'. .,.: ,, :". ';._:,..:.: . ··.:' ,.··'. ·:·.: .. ..... '..'. ·:·. >:-'; .··:·::. \:: .... ·.··:"·',1: . .- .... ·1.'· ·i .· ·_; _(::·, ,:·/\.\:,,,':,/\\.··.:·.;:·~.":i,/\;.> .·'\.,:\~r :,>i .. .-/i;··:. 
ll'At.t&oh"1W. vo~e·, ~· was teared,· the·. Versatli•• ::cl•us~il: dtaµ;~::w.1.t~::·,~: 
. ' . . '" .. ' . ' ' . . . 
ziiepurohase ot the J'Nnoh mines, eto. WCNlcl be difficult to enf'orcu~o· rr.nc»e 
thus took the position that Germ.any would. have to meet lfztencll dllll&nds on 
. ' . . . . . . 
these problems in advance, Qr the post-plebiscite goverrnent wuld be 
postponad)8 Bartholl furtherbelievedthat·tbaa~·neces1a2:7and wvoid.;.; 
. . . . . . . 
able deoisio~ should be made without the haste or :lnade~c:, which later 
37:t'b:ld., Sept•ber l, 1934, p, 6, Ma:, 31, 1934, P• 11, May 20, 19'4, 
P• 23, May 22, 1934, P• 15, and August 27, 19'4, P• 1. · . 
38zbi.d., Septeber 1, 1934, P• 6; Russell, l1lf. .§!K., Po 99. 
I } 
ci:f'CU11lstances mightf'o:rceo Restating Mbcurg"s contention., the aide«,,, 
memoim declared that French property in the Saarland. must be Ndeeed. 
; 
I 
in ~old in case ot ra.ttachemento. otherwise, rrance would. retain this 
I 
p~perty until Germa.l;\V'made adequate redemption .. Furthemore, the Ge:mans 
•uld not be allowed to confiscate these tranos now e:ircula~ in the 
: .. . . . ·.. . . . 
Saar; the French.·currency would instead_b~ used~ repurchase the min~s~· 
Thus, France attempted to secure Franc~Geman agreements. wbil~ theywe:re 
still obtainable1139 . 
Barthou told Qf' great benefits which would accl'lle 1:.o the Saar if' 
. . . ··~ 
'·-,=,~·-·: ·. 
:ra.ttachement W.eN rejected in the plebisoiteo He madf~lear that ~e 
would conscientiously consider turning the· .Dd.nes .. over.'~ private inter-
. .: - . . .. 
ests in the Saarland should the League .regime be maintainedo ~he aide-
............ 
memoire elaborated on this point by requesting the teape to ~n the 
. ' . . . . 
meaning ot status·2· By' such an explanation Ba.rthou hoped the League 
would then enter the propaganda field and thus directly oppose German er ... 
f'ortso Also, France favored more political. autono.my or responsibilit:,. 
tor the Saarlanders and would al.low the a popular oons~tuti()n if' a · 
status .9!2, vote resulted-. Barthou was ma.king bis bid for Saar supper~ 
.. ·· ... ··.· .•. ~.··.~·:~.~~:1&;:~;~. ~~;~f~'.''.''lil~;~!~~(~~t;tit 
Saar populace. Saar SOoiali.st and. even · Communist d~s 1!19M satisfied · .. · ·· ·· · · · · 
in this manner, giv.l.ng .credence ~ the idea .1-t .~· .. d.de,,.,memo:lre. compre ... 
:mi.sad the previous stands taken by the Frftnoh Gov~~ent.. Finally,,.~.h~d. 
. ... . ' . . . 
the Sa.arlanders vote to incorponte ,rl.th Pnnce, the7 wuld then· gain all 
. ' . 
39Rlleaell, l'.!!!, 1!!£,, PP• 99-100; P'lorinak:y, 1!!r. erssie. PP~ .170.., 
172. , . · ·> . ·. 
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argument against National Socialism.40 
The ai.de-memoire thus warned Germany that Barthou was willing to 
----
wage diplomatic warfare to obtain concessions over the Saaro Further, the 
Saarlanders were reminded that France would be extremely lenient should 
rattachement fail ... a point no Nazi could miss. Germaey, or course, pro'."' 
tested such statements, correctly claiming that the French note was de-
signed to oppose rattachemento But Ge:many was likewise infomed that a 
France under Barth.OU would no longer passively await def'ea.to Several' 
questions aroseo Particularly, would the Saar have another plebi,scite in 
case of a status guo vote, or would it remain pe:manently under league 
administration? No one answered directly, bllt Ba.rthou and the Saar 
Socialists intimated another vote, perhaps after HiUer11 s demi.Seo Thit;; 
strongly appealed to those Catholics and others who favored Ge:rm&!\Y' but 
opposed Hitler.. ~ Temps, however, perhaps fearing that a Franci0=German 
I 
schism might result from this "hard line," editoria:Lized ~gainst such an 
understanding of the status~ and declared that another plebi sci te would 
be extra-legalo4l 
Barthou followed up the !!9.!.-memoire by demanding that the League 
protect the rights of' P'renohlllen NU1n:1ng in the sa,ar after J~ry- l'.3o 
The Saarlandere• race and religion must be respected as well as their 
physioal well-being. Franae reali1ed the impossibility of' a pro ... FNnch 
vote, so she rostered the status .m!.2.• ~ this solution, a Rhine butter 
state would be perpetuated and econcmic advantages would not be lost.42 
l.f<>norlnsky, ~ Sk!if!:t pp. 170.17'2; Wulb&ugh, .§:!!£ P1ebis9rit,, 
P• 221; II! I2m, lm.t!,, Sep r 5, 19'.34,· P• 130 
4lnorinsk)", Baar §tnggle, Po 171. 
42BfK .12.£k ~. Sept•ber 5, 19~, l)o l'.3, and Sept•ber 9, 19'.34, 
sec. Iv;-ii'. 2 • . Seeil.10 M1ohael T. 11'1orinsky•1 article, "Opposing Forces 
in Saar Mobili~e for the Plebiscite," New I2tls. Tiptes. September 9, 1934, 
sec. VIll, P• '.3o . -
I 
I 
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Later in September,. Barthou.,warned. the League of the explosive Saar situ ... 
ation and declared that the maintenance ot ~rder was the Counc:il@s prime 
cons:1del"ation at the momento FranGe, he said, was somewhat anxious or 
her Saar responsibilities yet wished to avoid FNnGh intervention in the 
Tel'!"itory. Therefore, the Saar police must further be strengthened, and 
(again) the meaning of.' status act mu.st be explained.43 
One. plausible inter,,reta·tion of.' the new rrenoh attitude was ottered 
by Quinoy Hewe, editor of lb!. ~vins, Age.. Refer·ring tzoequently to the 
nonpartisan Paris monthly, I&, [~Sll!21, Hewe argued that Jzoench 
capi tal.ists supported Saa:ri scoialist opposition to Hi ~ler f'ori striiotl;y ... 
per1onal reasons. Contending that munitions manutactu:riers and ether in.. 
dustr1al11t1 used the Saar contl"Oversy to poison Franco-German ~elations, 
he further stated that the 1934 Dcmergue Government was 1ndustey0s tcolu 
This was the same o:1'.Rlumatanoe, Howe continued, that p!'Ompted Tardieu to 
deteat Bnandts conGiliation in 1929., Sino• that time, French capitalists 
had toste~ed their Saar oampaign th~cugh agitation, censored ~epcrts, and 
false inf'o!ffl&tiono44 Howe's logic seemed criedible, but did n~t explain 
why rrenoh suppo~t tor the ~tu~~ had been so half hearted before 
Septembe:r0s a~di...memcire., In a spee;ial article for the .!f!! Yor]t Times in 
early October, Franz von Papen seemed to suppo:rt this view by declaring 
that the June accord had been reaohed in spite ct F~nch intransigence., 
France, von Papen reported, had made wholly unreasonable demands, but 
Germany, Hitler, and he himself had bent every will towa:r>ds securing 
agreement by "obviat~niJ ever:, pretext that could be found for further 
p:rocrastinat1onQ"45 
4:3Ibid.,, September 28, 19:349 p., 8., 
/-t4Quincy Howe, W:>rld Diaty: l,22,.2:"'1934 (New York, 19'.34), pp., '.338=341., 
i 
/! 45New ~ Times, October 6, 19:34, sec., IV, p., lo 
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Other interpretati.ons were propounded, (l)f t'.'l(JUJ:>se, as the s't,:ruggle in 
the Saar between pan ... Gemanism and se~i!t{ continued.., Wr'lting in the 
I' London Dai~.z Herald, Harold J. l'.aski expressed the opinion ·that the Saar 
now favored the st,aa m!,!. over National SoGialism., Since Hi tleri had loSt. 
support, he must intensi.fy h:1.s campaign of persua11ion and intimidation. 
'Wlththe apparent· di~oMer in the Saar, such. sentiments led Barthou to 
state that France ~uld send troops into the Saa:r. to maintain. order if' 
necessary,, The resulting concentration or Freneh troops on the Saar> 
border worried the Germa.ns.. Germany called this tactic an :i.ntimidation. 
designed to influence Saar voters, bu.t Bitler did not regard Nazi demon-
strations and. actions in the same light. At Ccblenz in August, Hitle:r 
spoke personally to the Saa:t"landers 9 reiterating that the Saar> was the 
only h'anoc ... Qerman tert>1tor1al pzioblem.. A.nticipating the ef'teot,s cf the 
"'''' 
!1~!: .. memo1,.t!., per•haps, Hitler p~omised that, should. ret,taoh!!!n& oor:u.r•" .. 
Ge:nttany would build a great road. fl"Clll s.a:r.b:Aaeoken. to the Rhine. 8: pipe ... 
line to tu.dwi.gshaf'en, and a Saa:r,.,Rhine cianal .. 46 Opposing b:im 11 Max Braun 
tcok another tack by premising modi.tied scoial1sm, self ... govermen.t under 
a League-drawn ccnstituticn, and the probability of' another plebiaoite 
when lfltler :f'ell f'rcm powe:> should the status 9,,ao win., 
During September, D!l':t!. mas. tor,ces seemed to be gaining on ·the 
De~~s9.b!, J!t9!3~ as the !1dt"'!.f'1$)1re held out the hope that France would 
officially press for a neutral Saar& Unf'crtunately, Ba:rthou9s p:fcg:ram 
ended abruptly with his assassination at Marseilles on Octo'bel" 9, 1934. 
He had clearly improved French chances in the Saar, 'but only at the cost 
er d:l!"awing France a l~. tt~e farther f?Om the ma.instl"'eam ot Briand• s dreams 
of a Franco-German raEQ~chem.ent and the peace of Europe based upon the 
. 46aussell, :tht Saar, PP• 95=96; Wembaugh, §!.ar Pleb1so1te, PP• 219-, 
221. 
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settlement of.the Saar problemo Under Ba:rthcu, .a Framo .... Qeman rapgrcche-, 
~ would have been extJ'emely dif'f'icult; but then he had confronted 
Adolph Hitlero 
Eight days after Ba.rthou's death., more evidence of Saar iff'&gular:t. ... 
ties appearedo .Although estimates of eligible Sa&P voters ranged from 
2S0,000a300,000, some 520,00Q signed upo strong suspicion existed -UU.t 
· married wmen had ioegistend under thei:ri present and maiden names, that 
divorcees riegistered in a simila:r> wa7, and that laborers liv!ng i,n C!ne 
district and. WOl'Jdng in arwther registered it». botho SUcih amplicat1on1 
suggested that more time wa• needed for the plebisotte preparations to 
obtain a tru.17 tmstwcRh3 voteo A pcstpcnaent seemed 1nev1 table, and 
th!, thought added amther ccnt:riovereiy tc the a.1ready' embittered at. 
4" mesphere, ' 
Barthou Os death, which man,y SU.rl&nders felt was Nazi.,.insp!Nd., served 
to centime the Saar contusion without that hope fer a ha.P.W solution 
whioh his si._.~ ewkedo Political opinion was dioasticall.J' split, 
w1 th the l?!».kiht. ttiU'\. in cppca:i.t1cn to. a somewhat ~er but equally 
vocal organization cf Socialists and CIOY1111mnistso The g:Na.t number, cf' 
Rom.an Catholics weN known tc have q_ua.lms abo11t Nazism, yet·would not 
'' ..... ,., ., 
puh\ioly embra.~e the f~.attit !!!• They we!le the mainstays of the maje:rd.ty ·· 
Center put,ywhioh had ceased its activity in 193:3, fQllowlng t.he example 
of its -Reich cwnt,erpa.rt. Thus, outspoken opinion in the Saar> was large-
ly ·extremist ""'""' right. ®l" left ,,,,.,. but the plebiscite0s wtcome was still:. 
unpl"edictable., J?oU:tical, economic, and social factors favored France; · 
one estimate was that ten to twenty ,ears @f austerity would. have to.be 
., . 
47:eonnef'ws, .ffl.stoii,. Poli»,9ue9. v, 28:}; New Io:rk i,mes~~ September 
18, 19:34, p., 8. For a brief' suNey or Bar·thou0 s career, .see Bo~ef'ous, 
iJ,storl..! .t::?;t.it,i.9!!,t v,,, 283..,.289.,. 
·' 
bo:rne_by the Saarlanders before the Terr!t@r.y. could become economieally-
. 48 . . 
integr,,ated into the Reich. Nevertheless, the population was Geman, 
and the outcome would be c.f! tioale W1 th the tremendous questions lett un. 
answred at Baithou's death, particularly- the mnes payment. and, the 
maintenanoe ot older, an advantageous so1:uticn f'or France seemed tm.possi-
. . ~ 
bleo 
/ 
( 
P.leffe Laval now made serious efforts to ebtd.n such an advantageous · 
' . . ,,, . 
solution tt;,r 'lfrarloe as he 0U1e to the Quai d80rsay in Ootc'ber~ 19'4, 
. . ' . ' 
toward the end of the Saar oontl'O'Veny. A f'onae:r Scoialt1t, ta.val was no 
···~ 
less intent than his predeoesaon on s,!9)Q'l1i,~ and his ~•ate concerns 
included forging a.'J.lianoes with ltal,y and the Soviet Um.on. Bea.liming the 
gr,eater potent1.a1 "' the Ge:rman population and. industry', ta.val hoped these 
I ' ' ' ' ~. ·• 
new and major allies would. be the French a.newer to Hitler's thNat, parti,. 
cu.larly toward Eutem ·Eu.rope.· M. Laval, pacdti.cally inclinecl, -~greed._· 
' ' ' .. ,. 
with the teasu.e•s id.ea ot a community of :nations and. with cclleotive se-
ou.rit7, yet in addition desired.sJ;,ent.u W'ith the larger •.ta.tea. 
J'toame had been unsuec.;-ess:tul in. hezo earlier attempt, tc, build a system 
ct collective soeu.nt;r. Banhou had __ failed to torge an F.astem Locarno 
which included Gel'lU!J.V, and a F;raneo-Br.:Ltish-Itali.an pact had miscarried. 
Thus the French alliance s7St.em in oetober, 1934, included only Poland and 
the nations of the Petite Entente, Czechoslovakia, Rwllal1ia, and Yg.goslavia, 
-
who themselves had nc common policy. :taval believed England to be indis ... 
pensable to French security, wt Britain and. France often disagreed_di~<> ... 
-· 
ma tically. He furthel" feared an Italo-Geman understanding, yet the often 
poor Italo ... F:rench relations did not seetll adequate to prevent i:.his. 
Ritlerian Ge'!'!DUY' ...... powertul, dynamic, disciplined - was the great 
problem of .French diplomacy. In this connection,· Lt.val f'ace.d a major di-
lemma i had circumstances altered the anti ... Fremh expressions of Mein Kampf, 
or was Hitler sineet>e with his peace protestations? 
Of the Versailles settlement, only the final disposition of the Saar 
remaineda Intwall.ied. debts a.ncl :repa.r·ations ha.d virtually been dr-opped., 
and disamame:nt was fa.st becom:tng only an 'l.l.'lus.ion~ Hi tlezo never wa.ve:red 
over the Saar and nei.the:ri did French vigilame,, Militarily, .France was 
ori.e:nted ·toward the doot:r:i.,nes of' defensive wa:'fl•fa.:r,e, and :tava.1 pref'en~ed 
. . 
to negotd.at.e :r.a.tbe11 t.han ex:er.1t. foH:e~ Ccmil.iat.1.on, :1.n · f'act 9 dominated 
hie Saar .Policft. and unde,i• :it Hitle.r wn h.ts first te.nitorial. v1c.to:tiiy~1 
Du.?>"ing Barthwqs tenure, the r.,ommitt.ee of' Tlu,ee had. :fle@Ogrdzed ·the 
inadequaoy of Saat" pclici.ng.. S.ime mu«.llb. agitation Nsulted f':t"Om the Baa.f.l 
probl.emiY :Fmnoe had demanded that a ma..intenanoe ot orde:ti be assured in 
order to pNvent sucih :intimi.dation and reprisals as might imra.lidate th~ 
plGbise:1tejjj The flrst step ·taken by the League was to rely en local r,e ... 
cruitA.ng to augment the Te~~ .. ~ey0s torees. Sin,oie this was ineffective, 
F1;an~e p~posed an internaticnal fo~e ttndler I.eague auspices 't@gether with 
certain guatoeiees by Gem&r.11e Such guarantees ....... proteeti,·n, rd" mimfi ... 
ties, prese:r,vat.ion li)f the pl.ebi..ac1tet1s integrity; a.asut'ances aga.:i.nst re-
prisals """ ~~ not easily obtained and became a bargaining point by which 
C':ermany hoped to gai.n an early plebisci t..e,. l~el)tually France an~ .. ~many 
reached an agreement; Germany gave her gu.arantees and. fl'1al')Oe specined" 
the date oi' J'anuary 13, 1935, for the voteo 2 Uhf'<0irtunate.1y11 h@wever, the 
Ge:r::m.a.n guarantees were net as stringent and binding as Frame would have 
liked .. 
The question o,f order had dominated the late summer of 1934 and 
prompted concern f'~m many qua:r•terstl In Septemberil Chaiman Knox repc,rted 
-
1Alfred Mallet, ~!F..! T.av~ (2 vols .. ; Faris, 1955), I, 55..,64. 
2wambaugh® S8.a.l" Plebiscite .. nn., 177-1800 
~~l.'l);l'JuS~:,-1:'}:'-
that l.6,ooo sa.arlanders ~re recei.v.ing mil,it,ary trairdng ~t. C'ieT~uan ex-
pense in prepar•ation f'o-r, the 1,935 plebiscite., Verified by o·ther sou:rices, . 
this inf'omu,tien d~.stttr-bed. i;he l'french and gav$ ithe t..o the.d.r tear of a 
Nazi ;m,~titb,t Barthou. the-n :1.ndicated his Nadi:n.e1H to send F:·ench troops 
int.o the T.e:rri to.r.i, to maintt:l.:n o:rde:r1• Tb.is :in all probability WGU.ld have 
precip:itated calam.i.tJ; and ·tb.e Fr>ench -ru.dily agreed that an int,el"ftf.tional. 
force was pNf'esbl.e tit) F'~emh ·int.e-went:l.on/3 Neve.r.theles1, the French 
1.sserted that f!fSi~'tf. would not adl.Td,t of' Ger't!Wl troops en the French 
bordet0a The French Minirrter ot ~:t'i1 Mai"shal. Henri. Petain9 ocns:1.derf>d 
that a ~b. was unlikely, bu.t in a:tf3' case had a. oon·tt.ngeno7 plan for 
such an event.. (Jhai:nu.n I<hox l:1.k:ewise net.teed t,h.e deterd.orat:i,on of h•noc ... 
. . 
Ge!"M.ln rela.t.ions ,ind added his vroiee in asking fl'lllr the creation c,f' a. I.11ague 
police :f'o:ree~ 4 With the possibi.l:i.ty ct '.F!>emh and Ceman tl"il»ops coming 
taoe to faoe, w&l' seemed dangerously near .. French garrisons in Alsace 
and l.ort\t:bte held tbemselv·es ready,, and the civilian p~~ti(jn in ther1e 
d4!!pa.rtm,nts was in a hl.ghly nervou.s eta.te"' Even t,he pro ... Ge:ma.n Saar was 
amicus as, il'! Oc·t.ober, two ecii,nl00li1e afid· labor· t'!.itgmt-:&a·bicim 'in th~ ,.saar ... 
:lJ,u•d · r~1 te:1:oa. ted th'1) .· supposed N~!i:i ~ntent to inv;.ate the· teni tol"l l!md 
'•'·" -· .. 
, ~~1\r.J~.e~~d .:for: ~ut:,al police,, 
ta.va1 6s accession to the Qu.a.1 d'Orsay changed this scene. He opposed 
the use of fo't"Ce, yet F:feneh opi.:nion a:n:ticipated the need tcr mra. troops 
1n the Saar® Most obse:t"Vers seiemed ·t.o think that Knox9 s request could not 
.be f:J,11 ed voluntarily and tha:t ·the Governing Ccmmtission would then requ,st 
France to honor her obligation to maintain order in the Saar. But Laval 
-
P• 40:Uexs:n.de~ Werth, Ih!, !t-~12! lr!.,.~j llll-!2!2 (I.ondon, .1942), 
l, 4 .. ~ssellt Ih! §!.!£, pp" 95""96; !!!!: ~ ~' October 31, 193t~, pp. 
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f'r1endly 1 oir· .a:t least wo1.t>kable:J1 s:ett:l~men:t.... G1~at, Bl".itt.:dri sitippo:i,t.ed this 
idea err a l:i"ra:n©<c,.,Qe.xma:n tU .. al,1:llgue a.nrd exp:l'.'essed i.:.he 11:1ptr.d .. o:n that t(i'!eriisions 
pcn·ts wer.,e b?··oarkias:t, that d:isgutsed Nazi. stQm 'tf"()J«)pel:'s we:lr'e en:t,re:wlng 
i!')· the Saa.'.!~~ · 
'T'he z;•:re.noh became anxiO'~l.is anel bel ,,,eved tha:t t,he ,':.1/aar· t;)ou:!Ld. eas::lly 
pr•eed.r,it't: .. \11.~:e 1tl'.Mf.l>thel" :.l .. :nte1n:m.t:i1.ond e1.~1l.os:lon, By t.he :f'.'i:t'S't, ot Nifli·11·e11'lbe·t·, 
''high 1:1i:u,xlC"'i::.et•s 1~ saw ::tn t,he m.de1.ly, ... ·flU©1ti\$1d. a~1.'l!11a:n ·p·it"oss a '~ltlllea:r ~bid:leia:ti1:m 
that the w,.z,:ls ha:ve beer1 ·thinki.·il'Ag 1:rJ:" s,ed.z:lng t.he :1°:1.cih indu~rt?rla.l .ru:0ea.., 1111 
1,r•he San:,:., howe.ve:r, TA'BS ·1.u1rii~pt~·rbi:nt. ti, Cie1mai'!iy in ara ee())riord .. o. 1.sieinse; 
na.d.i,.r,!lilism p:r•,1.w.ided theJ m;:1ln l~Hi d:t'i,,re :1:"t,:r~ the ~3a&il:'~ iilile wa.1• talk 
in,e~l!'e&sed., l:,av,(l n.egi:irti.at.edl# He 1u.1·f~ed 'the '.ll>itttltirih ·to se.nd ·t.o 
niaintdn Qlt'dflt' 1:n t,.he, f:!;ai!it'1lanr.J bt1.t,, ,t;..hey at :t".Lrtrt:. detzli:neid,. ft:r,~J'll~e appea.tied 
t."~a.dy ·t,~ a,:cept. its t'es1~or11-idbi1l·t:,:tf.ls 1Ln. t;:he S.IA!tr~J t~:11~ SJ' '.lt, 2thl\%li,:ri.t; di.s ... 
. asteit"~ 6 
By Ne;vembtii:r 5, i,;,he Br~itd:sh :t•elented.* At f'i.t•st, the }l"o):Ndg:n S.e1cr·e·taey 
denied a:rq neieess::i:t.y :f'ot" outs:!vde tr•oopst(\ 'lt.ien Pt:i]'iliament. dis~«»,tered that 
British subjeci:.s wet'~ being aic~e11ted 1n:fol" serr·dce in t.he Saar. p-t'lil:il'le., 1• 
tattfr~ Ji'Time M:in.:isrtat• H1.msay Mat~Do:n,ild deela·t0ed in CollrtmOttt:s that; the League 
61bid,. ti No·vembe't' 2~ 193I;.:1> p., 6~ Nove.mbet<· :3 1. 19:3ti, p,., 2, and Novembe:r~ 
4, 193t1,,j set~~ IV, p,. l~ 
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recruitment~ The Saar Goveming Commission would $pl.oy these police for 
the purpose of relievi.ng F'ra.nce of' :tt,s :i?esponsibili~y in tbe Saar. By 
the same token, this f'i.rs·t :i.ntema.tionally ... sanctio:n.ed force was in ... 
tended to tos.ter mo:r.ie peaceful EuNpea.n :r:'61.a.tions. 7 
r.iaval II s policy triwnphed tor th& moment, and. O,r.man agi tati .. on slack ... 
ened. Chai.man Kno.x, however, was tb.e !"eal. engineer of the rel.ati.ve .calm 
af'te:r. November, f.ci:r, :U; was he who fo:11:ed SM.tain to take an active inter ... 
est :ll.n the Saar problem41 But ·tlie tt',5.ckle of' men pt"Ov.1.ded by su!C\h vclun ... 
ta;rism was not enough. Knox intimated th:1.s as he requested i~he con-
tinuation of F'reneh troops en. the bo'l'lde·r- and then ask~ the League J'cr a 
large:r force. The persistent 1.nadequacy ot the Saar pol.ice vi:r.t~~ly 
compelled Fn.noe to i.nsist on the presence of her troops · at the pleb!"" 
sci t'.e,, On :December S, the ever conciliatory and peaceful .ta.val person-
al.17 pet,i ti.oned the League ·to send more troops & In a. surp:ri,se move1 
Anthony Eden immedi,ately supported this p.lea and. oontr.lbuted several 
Br:U:.ish :t"egiments fer Sur se:t-v.1 .. ce provided other nations woul(d do like"" 
wise. Rll,ssia, !tal:y, and t~1eohoslo·vaki.a ~ckl.y conouM'ed i.n this move 
8 and the crisis passed. 
Britain also made her contribution of troops continge:n.t on. Fren~h. 
and Gema.~ approval. lie.val was of' course happy to_ comply and _t.h~ .Ge~s 
eonsented too .. Frame had several reasons to be thankful. The interest 
of peace was served, but France was concerned that Germ-.nyha.d attributed 
relieved that danger had evidently passed .. Laval received much prtci,se at 
this time, and even !t!,T,entP~ expressed pleasu.re.,9 Mo:>m.enta.rily, at least, 
'7M,. EJ,stein, ed~ ~ !h!. !..~ B!s!~:1!,t, ~9'.34 (London, 1935), p~ 90. 
8Thid., pp .. 98 ... 99; Russell, !!!!. §!!!:, P• 97. 
9New York Times, December 6, 193Li, pp. 1, 13, and December 7, 1934, 
p .. 18.----
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the peace l!!Jt Fram.e was secured; but another vital q~estion, lii'rench 
prestige, still hinged on the rapidly approaching plebi~cite. 
' 
Ba.7.'thou9 s aim had. been to in:fli.ct a ''moral de.feat on Germany'~ 'by 
means of the Saar plebi.so1 te~ Wi t.h ·this i.n mind., France accord::ingly 
supported the !:t!!-.!! !ma• Laval Os purpose was that of comiliatitm, and 
he l"ega-rded t.he pleb1scd:f:.e as a nasty b\1.·t, necessary business. Even be ... 
fore 193.5 he hoped f'oti a Franco ... Geman E!llmsbemsi and ev1.d,~tlybe ... 
. 10 
11eved this possible onoe the contrcversy over the Saar was settled. 
In a way, one is reminded of Br1and11 s 1929 policy, but the Geiirma.ny of' 
l9'.35 was vastly different from that of Stresemann°s ~ra. 
As he had done on the question o:r. sa.-.1" order, rJ.aval tried to r>esolve 
othet" disputes through direct nego·tiat.ion with Germany, In October, 1934, 
Fran~ois ... F.oncet had expressed confidence that the mines issue ©ould be 
easily settled, and ta.val thus began a new evaluation or the problem... The 
Treaty of Versailles had provided that, in case of ra.tta.ohau.§.'.f}~, Saar mines 
· Wl"e to be bought from France in gold.. But Gemany9 s gold si tuatic:m. in 
19:34..,19'.3.5 was not too 'bright.. With Hitler• s accession, prospecti.ve 
cr,editors disappeared, loans were difficult to obtain, and. the domestJ.~ 
situation of·ten contributed to anything 'but an economie boom., Barthou had 
earlier stated unequivocally that this financial problem. must be settled, 
and even threatened a postponement of the plebiscite it it weN not., By 
contra.st, l&val exchanged assur,ances with German of:f'i.cials to relieve 
Saar tension .. 11 Even when he made a "strong" stand, Laval vacillated, 
as when he reaffimed the r,!g,b,t to use troops in the Saar. Fundamenta.lly, 
the French position had not changed, btit Laval temporized just the same. 
--
p .. 4-0 .. 
11!!!! .~ ,~, December 6, 1934, pp. l, 13, and December 7, 1931~, 
p,. 18a 
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. French ooncern over reports of German ~mament continued and a· reaction. 
to Ribbentrop's de~iation of the Versailles military clauses disturbed 
France. Yet Franco-Geman trade •gotiat1ons were begun and Lav-3. 
honestly hoped tor favorable tems~12 
On November 1.5, Lt.val proposed that J'ranoe toroe Germa:ny- to negot1. 
,. 
. . . 
ate With the League rather than F.Nnoe over the rad.ning Saar ctUestions. 
In this way, perhaps, France would. at least be partially renoved trom the 
oontroveNy. He tu.rther denied all~ oldlu ot au~ol'ity in the 
Saar, but 1'0Uld defend only VereaUles a.ncl the. ~P•, not F.Nnob inter-
. ' ' 
eats, in thia respe&t. Two dqa later, Hitler returned the olive b~h 
bJr renouncing .&I'll plans tor annexation, .and promised hie support ot the 
plebisoite•a result. Although he reiterated .. his oppoat.tlon to war ("which 
wipes out the elite"), .m.tler pointedly did. not agree to support the. 
League• s decision, 13 which :m&Y' Ol' may not correspond to the votiq N• 
iults, 
.•. 
r>ut.ng this time, the Saar eooneto situation had deteriorated. WJ.'th 
the plebiscite imminent, sa•land•'8 boarded their trams and thus reduced 
I, , . . 
the amount ot c:l.roulating capital. It was teared that Gel'IW\Y would force 
the S&arlanders to tum their tranos• or the equivalent in gold, cr,er t.o 
. . ' . . ' . . ,· .. 
the Reiohsbank .1.n return tor the loss v:a1uable mark.:·. Many thtt• i,~,d .. ·· . 
•· I ., ' . ·,. 
their savings in.France or SW1t1erla.nd. The French estimated the f'ra.ncs 
in the Saar to amount to 1.8 billion, &l\ld asked tor Geman.,0s plfdge, to. 
retum them in partial payment for the coal mines shC>Uldrattachem.ent ~· 
sult. Germany, claiming that only' six hundred million trams were there,· 
. . 
would rather use them~ bolster its .own foreign trade and to buy ra,r 
12lb1d., November 8, 19'4, p. 12, and November 10, 1934~ p~ 7. 
1'™d·, November 16, 1934, P• 12, .and November 18, 1934, p~· 7. 
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materials. Laval's policy seemed to end thts controversy as, on November · 
- 26, an accord was reached. Apparentl7, ta.val agreed not to push an anti• 
Hitler policy in the Saar i.n ;rietum fox- Hitler's agreement to negotiate 
a :financial settJ..ement as soon as possible.14 
Opposition, particularly f'l"Olll Herriot, arose to this deviation from 
B&rthou Os poli.cy, and Laval valiantly defended hie policy· before the 
Chamber of :Deputies. The Fo:r.eign Minister declared that no territo~al 
question existed between France ~d Geman, since the Saar wru, proper1y 
under an international fNmework. He continued• 
It depends on Qe:t'!Wly that the pleb:boite takes pl.ace under 
regular conditions. Pot' our part., we have .no other.desire 
than to see a free and secret Tote assured. We accept in. 
advance the r_esult ot the plebiscite. We express hope that 
ordel' will not be disturbed, and it it is, rranoe will. re .. 
main read:, to do her duty in assund.ng all her international 
obligations. 
JBibbe.ntrop was in Paris at the time, and Laval was inviting a nori .. 
aggression paot. He rejected a bilateHl treat:,, however, and dis-
associated France from the Saar. In this manner he seemed to be working 
tor an Eastern Loca.rno .. 15 
Laval was obviousl;yteying to ehuttle the Saar :lnto relative.ob .. 
sc~rity in orde.r to toster better Franco-Geman Nl!t1C>nf3. a;ey- doing SC>i 
. . ·. . ·. ·_ ..... 
or course, Frenchinterestfn the Territory decreas~d;·andtht.Saarlandets 
were the first to notice this. One conte:mpora.ry believed that Laval 
wished to subo;rdi.nate the territorial aspect and confine Francc,-,~Ge~n 
relations to a pro and con argument over militarism. This would naturally 
redound to France's advantage in world·opinionand.also se~e to.qlii.et 
14n,1d., November 27 t 1934, P• 9. The French Foreign ottiee denied. 
this report. 
~ . . . . . . . 
.!!?!. I!!k Times, December 1, 1934, P• 6. 
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talk of a French drive for European hegemony. o,_th.e 0,ther ha.%.ld, nego<!S' 
tiations ever the mines_settlement were· not complete, am·taval may have 
16 . hoped to reap certain benefits. f~ that. Neve~theless, because of 
taval 0s policy, the French were no longer able to influence the outcome 
ot the Saar struggle. 
On December 3, 1934, came the &MO"tmOement that the long'!"awa.ited. 
Franco ... Qeman accord.over financial, economo, and politi~ail p~l;>lems had 
been reached. at Rome. With the Committee or Three as intermediary, it 
was agreed that all French property in the Saar would be red.eemed by a 
German payment of nine hundred million f'.r,anos in case of P.:t:t_uh~n1'• 
In addition, the private French companies operating in the i.:.rndt district 
we:re to receive eleven million tons ot coal. .from the Saar over a period of 
f'ive years o~ until the money payment was completed. This provision was. 
designed also to aid the ~man goverinent in th~r payments. t.val thus 
declined to embarrass ·m..tler·.t1nanoiUl7. Ge:rmany also agreed to protect 
minority rights tn the Saar, but this pl'Omise was probably just window 
. . 
dressing to help .La.val sell the agNement to the FNtnch.17 
On the firth ot December. Baron Alo:1.si reported the accord to . the 
,. . . J 
League am.id expressio~ ot su:~se. In 1919, Ge?m&JlY' had. placed the value 
or the saar ve.ry high, yet du:f:l.ng the Le•gue' s administration $h~ c~•d o' 
that the F.renoh were.wasting Saar resources through "illegal".ope~tio~. 
After 1920, Gemaey took the position that the French had been tully>re-
· .. _ paid and were thus entitled to no German payment in 1935. · France had in 
.fact been repaid for the wartime destruction to her mines since about· 
. . . . 
;" 
1925.. In light of Germany's previous attitude, then, her agr~einent in 
16 Ibid .. ; December 2, 1934, sec.. IV, P• 1. 
17:tbid .. , December 4, 1934, p. '1, and December 6, 1934, p. 12. 
?1 
1934 was a remarkable concession. 18 Politically, it deter~ed the French . 
from making a major effort to win a status e plebiscite and left the . 
campai.gn almost entire.1y .in Germa.n hands. Had Ge:rmaey feared the conse .. 
quences of the plebiscite, she could have made no better bargain than the 
Rome accord with ta.val. Coupled with the British support .or an inter-
national police force, this :repurchase.agreement enabled France to re ... 
move herself .from the Saar without damage to prestige or pocket book. 
Thus, the proposed. "duel between dictatorial and democratic systems•• did 
I 
\ . ' 
not occur, and Hitl'er had in tact beneti.tted from the first French ettort 
at appease111ent.19 
fa,~.-Bonoour, in descri.bing these times a. decade later, charged th~t 
the chances for a status m.!9.. settlement were quite good in 1934, but were 
sabotaged by Laval in the Rome accord. By this 111easure, France had 
abandoned the Saar in the beliet that she was rostering peace. Su.pport~rs 
of the status _guo readily embraced this plan which seemed mu~u~ly bene-
ficial ·to French and German capitalists.· With the resulting la.ck of 
interest in propaganda and the maintenance ot an international .regime, 
the Saar was handed over by defa.ult. Even many Sooial:l.ets, while still 
favoring 1tatus guo, h~ped !Iitl•~'·s campd.gn, ey le;~"1llg tb.e Saarland and 
going into volunt&~r:extle~20 .. , ·.· . .. . . . ··.. . .. 
On the heels of' the Franco-Ge:rman accot"d, the Saar s:,.tuat.io~ co~-
tinued muoh as before with _ only the p:redictable .·final. maneuve:rings added 
by the opposing t"ot'Ces in the Saar. Earlier, 50,000 Saar residents were 
18 . · ·_ .. · ·. · . . . · Russell, The Saat, pp~ l<>l-102. 
19The Annual Reg!ster, ~· PP• 161 ... 163; New.!??!$. Times, November 
5, 1934, p .. 2. : . . · .. •. 
20paul.-Boncour, Entre !!.!:S G!err,s, III, 6-7; er. touis. de Vienne, 
' 8t.e problae de la Sarre," L'Illustration., CXC (January 5, 1935), 7 .. 8. 
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said to have proolaimed·their intent to seek retttge in France should 
rattachement o.ccur. Saar Socialists and ComlmUlists ·continued to oppose 
Hitler and the scheduled plebiseite. On November 15, 1934, for example, 
their loosely organized Common Front charged that no less than 10,oao 
. ' . 
dead men had been registered as voters. On the other side, the Deutsch~ 
Front purchased an opposition newspaper in the Saar and continued to re .... 
,, 
duce status quo suppert.·21 
On the diplomatic level, the Rome acoord. had the a.~i~ry effect of 
improving Franco-Italian relations, and. Lavalr moved to secure his 
Mediterranean pact. The Soviets, too, were said to have engaged in more 
discussions with the French as a result of this orisis. The :t'oma.tion of 
an international policing force in the Saar appeared to ~ssure an o:rdePly 
plebiscite. This was much to be des:1red over the ea~l,ie:r;- expected 
violence. Franco-German relations were ,eased considerably, but the French 
remained wary. B;v' utilizing the warndt mines,. P'rance believed itself able 
i 
to counteract any German d~aurtt of the mines payments_ by mi~ng Saar coal 
through French pit-heads. such operations were f.rowned upon by inter-
national law, however, and Genuan.v was not pleased by the pos~ib::Llity.:22 
In .France, preparations were underway toward.the end c>:t 19:34 to 
.. . . . 
counter the possible e:f'feots of ra~taohement. A deois:S;on by the Chamber 
ot Deputies on :December 20 gave the Goveffllllent emergency powers to deo~e 
quotas and tariff regulations. In this manner, France might quickly re-
pair any- economic disruption in trade with Alsace and_Lo~, throµgh 
heavy duties on Saar products. Perhaps this action was also pointed 
21New York Times, NQveml;,er 5, 1934, P• '2, Noyember 16, 1934, P• 12, 
and DecE111be~, 1954, p. 12. · __ 
22Ibid., December 8, 19:34, P• 8, December 12, 1934, P• 1.5, and De .. 
cember 26, 1934, P• ~2. 
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toward Saar voters who would find thaaselves at a disadvantage should 
France so act. otherwise, the French seemed satisfied that the Rome ac- .• 
cord was a good bargain. As the first British troo~s began their trek 
toward the Saarland, they received tumultuous welcomes from the French 
towns through which they passedo 23 
One week before the plebiscite, Propaganda Minister Goebbels and 
deputy party chief ~dolph Hess acknowledged the French conciliation by 
stating that a Germ.an vote in the Saar would "help the cause ot peace, in 
that economic problems would be solved." The two Nazi leaders promised 
that Hitler would henoetorth be less hostile to P'ranoe and repadiat, his 
earlier denunciations, and predicted that a solution in the Saar -would re-
move Franco-German "territorial stri:f'e." Thus, f'rom Goebbels and Hess 
came the admission that P'Nnch action was instl'Ulllental in removing barriers 
to German polioy.24 
Por its own part, France attempted to remove the possibility of dis-
. 
order on the eve of' the plebiscite. In response to the expected hordes 
... ' 
ot refugees in case or rattachement, the Goverment sent addi:tional i'oroea 
and established first-aid stations on the Franco-German border. French 
Saarlanders returning to vo~ did not receive direct govern11ental assis-
tance as did those from Germany ahd elsewhere, but ~d have their fares 
and expenses paid by the private Franco-Saar Union. France seemed to be 
taking those precautions necessary for the immediate peace Qf ~rope, yet 
was largely oblivious or its opportunities in the Saar for lasting harmony. 
The plebiscite itself was elaborate, with the secrecy and neutrality of 
23Ibid., December 21, 1934, p. 10. 
24Ibid., January 7, 1935, P• 14. 
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' 
the vote ass~ed to the greatest degree poss:ible,,25 
·i 
. ,1 . . 
The political situation witbin .the Saar Basin had remained. virtually 
/.' . 
-- unchanged/sir.ice P.a:rithouts ministry,, The :Rome accord largely settled the 
I 
tinanciai questions in French favor, yet !£.a.tu! .9!.!. was s~:l not fully ... 
I . 
explained,, Through negotiation, France had apparently ass'1red the mainte .. 
nazu,e. ot order tor the Saar, but had. al.so und:ermined the Fr.$nc~. position 
: . . . 
·by .&1;)andon1.ng the pro .. !!i,tut 9auo forces. To the end., Soci~ists and 
Qo~nists und.er Max BJ'la.un im,t.ested against a ffl;tlerian. Saar, and were 
. , 1· . 
. . J.~orously opposed by' the peutsch1, [ront~ 26 
'·,II 
·· i · 'l'he woric ot the Plebiscite Commission, th.a ·ce~ter ot Saar a.u~ority, 
in 1935, continued and was. greatly :f'ac.ilita·ted by the presenc:s, of the 
. international troops. The massive demonstrations w~ch .. marked 19:34 ~:tte 
severely limited• and violen~e and agitation correspol1Qi,.gly dec~ased. 
The expected invasion force trm Germal\V 11. led by SpaniQl, . had. been 
neutraliz-ed. by the inte:m.ational torce. Only a few isolated incidents, 
and those impossible to control, maned .the scene •. 
Another element intruded. upon this situation a f'ew: days before the 
voting. The bishops of· Trier and Speyer prompted the Saar clergy to em-
brace rattachement wholeheartedly~ .. ,, Church bells beg411 to toll, .f.o.r :' (,;'.·· ··· 
Germany., public prayers:. fcjr ~ttaohement .lrlere calledf~~-JaritUt_~:\:iit<~a;• •. ·. 
the clergy placed itself on record as recGD1ending a German vote. Churches 
were illuminated at night to symboUze their total commitment w·the great 
,• I ' .. , . ·• • ·. ·• ',, ... 
national movement., On the hills S'Ul"l"Ounding the Saar- border, massive ·. 
25 Ibid.,, January 13j 1935, PP• 1, 31. 
26te Vienne, "Le probl~e de la Sarre," L'Illustration, CXC (January 
5, 19'.35), 7~; "Veille de plebiscite,» t'lllus\nti~n, CXC (January 12, 
19'.35), l5o . . - . . 
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bonfires were lit "to salute the Germ.ans or the Saar."27 No avenue was 
left untraveled in the German attempt to impress upon the Saar~anders 
their responsibility to the Third Reich and to discourage anti .. Geman 
sentiments. 
The day of the plebiscite was clearly a victory for the democratic 
process ..... when supported by overwhelming force. Although the Nazi 
vehemence against anything not favoring the Reich continued, no incidents 
were reportedo The Saarlanders turned out in massive numbers to vote, 
with the elderly, the inti:rm, and the ill being conducted. to. the 944 
voting bureaus in any manner possible. In each bureau was a three-man 
examining board headed by a president recrm.ted from a neutral c011ntry 
such as Holland, Switzerland, or ~-bourg. Two additional observers 
were present, one each from the Deutsche Front and f1'f)Jll the re-created 
and opposi11g United Front. When the polls closed at eight o'clock, the 
sealed ballot boxes were transported under maximum security to Saar-
b:ruecken. 'l'he counting began the next day and continued all night under 
the direct scrutiny of the Plebiscite Commission. By 5a00 a. m. on 
January 15, the counting was completed, but the announo•ent or the re-
, 
sults was dela19d tor two hours more.28 
Ot the 539,541 votes cast, 11,536 abstenticma ~'.ad 2249··nui:w'1oations 
left 525,756 valid ballots. 477,119 ot these favored Oe1'm&1'1iY, 46,513 were 
for the statu1 sms., and 2124 favored France. Thus, 90,36 per cent or the 
vote went to Germany, a.al per cent to status e, and o.4 per cent to 
France. The proportion differed but little throughout the Temto1",Y'. In 
27uv1e.11e de plebiscite," t•Illustra.tion, CXC (Janua.ey 12, 1935), 351 
Naudeau, . "Le plebiscite de la Sane," t•Mu;tration, CXC (January 19, 
1935), 620 
28ntes resultata otti~iels," t•must;r,.tion, cxc (January, 1935), 66-
67, 
Saarlouis, France received its greatest support from one district with 
727 votes; 85,230 voted for Ge~ny. Saarbruecken tallied the largest 
status .9S2, vote, almost 23,000, yet gave Germany nearly 200,000029 
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That night joyful manifestations were in evidence by the residents 
or Sa.arbruecken, and an estimated 100,000 persons took part in a tri-
umphant torchlight march. Significantly, Hitler's voice was also heard 
' 
as he asserted by radio the indestructible attachement to the Fatherland 
exhibited by the Saarlanders. 11'1:t'teen years of in~stioe, he said, were 
removed by the plebiscite, the results of which reatfi,med that Providence 
had chosen him •as chi.et or a great nation." The Saar, Hitler continued, 
was a first step to the reconciliation or wartime eraities and tow.rd the 
pac11'1cat1on or Europe. No more territorial. disputes Nm&ined between 
Fanoe and Germany, and!!. facto equality had. been accol,'ded the Reich 
through the pre.plebisoi te negotiations.. All tha.t remained tor European 
p~ace was the ~ .11!£!. assurance to Oema.ny ot equal rights, a necessary 
step in the institution or "a sincere solidarity or nations in. race ot 
the dangers and the distress of present times." French Pr-1,r Pierre 
Flsndin was said to have made corresponding declarations at the same 
t1me.'.30 
The ninety per cent Saar vote tor rattachement was a bitter judgment 
for the French Goverrment, but one which it accepted -1thout equivocation. ( . 
Individually, Frenchmen were not so magna~uso Despj.te th~ over .. 
whelming decision, Indovic Naudeau argued that numerous Saa:rla.nde~ had. 
hoped for status .9!!2.0 Economic, political, and financial advantages were 
29 66 Ibid., Po o 
30Ibido, p., 67; Naudeau, "Histoire et morale du plebisoi te sarrois, •• 
L'Illustration, CXC (January 26, 1935), 94. 
i 
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17 
overthrown by ratta.chanent, and anxiety permeated the Saarland in contem-
plation of its fate under National Sociali~o Yet the mo·ral obligation 
,' 
to the Fatherl~d •phasimed by the German leaders c~ed the day, and 
a German victory .:resul.tedo flie determining tactor seems to have been 
the Catholic voteo "4bereae m&rJ1' had earlier tavored statue S!!.2., Catholic 
' 
opposition to Hitler ee•ed to wither in the face ot the declarations tor 
... 
rattach9nt by the bishops ot Speyer and Mero Naudeau alleged that 
these bishops reluctantly decided to support National Soc1~1em in the 
St,ar tor tear that should they not do 10, reprisals wwl.d be directed 
ag~net Catholics in Geman:,o Thus the npport ot the Chu:roh provi~d 
the final impetus in the plebieoite, and profoundly attected its out-
~ome)1 
rrenoh opinion continued to ins1~t that the plebieoi te would ta-
oili tate a l!'m-opean peaceo Sinoe the League authored. the Saar vote, and 
the Rome negotiations in Deoeber concluded its preparations, France did 
not contest the pleb1so1te results in any fashion. To do 10 would have 
. 
compromised France•• position in respect to her international treaties 
. .. 
which tomed the basis other f'oreign policy. Popular opinion, anxious 
as it was tor »iropean accord, hoped. that the Saar experience would lead 
to Franoo .. Qe:rman rapport, and Pranier Flandin's si.teme~s, which cited 
the Saar solution as a successful beginning ot a new French policy, en-
C0\11"8.ged this hope. The Rome accord, he argued, had granted definite 
guarantees to French f'inanc1a1 interests and commerce, and had provided 
for minority rights against repression. Furthermore, the Premier asserted, 
Germa.n;r had now retumed to the ccnmunity of nations, and this would lead 
31Naudeau, ''Le plebiscite de la Sarra," t•lllustration, axe (January 
19, 1935), 62Q 
to many other improvements in European relationso Flandin f'oresawan 
arms settlement, envisioned a guarantee for Austrian independence through 
the Franco-Italian pact, and even characterized the long ... dei'erred Ea.stem 
I.ocarno as at last possibleo The end of the Saar question eased Franco .. 
German relationso Only the question or German sincerity and peacefulness 
remainedo:32 
still, the Saar0s overwhelming rejection or France in the plebiscite 
had not been expected, and gave rise to a gamut ot reaotions ranging tl"Ol!l 
stolid aoquiescenae to bitter disappointmento The ll'rench Qovern11eni moved 
to expedite the tinal transfer ot the territo17 to a.man sovereignty, and 
prepared to admit Nfugees from the Saaro Rightists called tor ·m.ore •· 
phasis on militai7 preparedness and a~ked that the amed forces be in-
creasedo tef'tists, ~ ot whom had 'believed a status !m.2, vote poss1~~' 
declared that the Saar had voted for 1lavei7, and they teared that a N• 
vi.val ot Frenah nationalism might result from ito The Frenoh Socialists 
I 
were in tact surprised that a "proletarianized, heavily industrialized 
region" such as the Saar could embrace National Socialism, and considered 
the plebiscite a manifestation of the generally increasing tension in 
Franco-German relationso'.33 Frenoh miners, already suffering from con.,. 
siderable unemployment, reared that Saar refugees would be employed in 
I.orraine mines and that the deliveries ot Saar coal to French companies 
would turther decrease the number of jobso Yet no organized outcry on the 
part or Frenchmen was heard, and the mood of France as a whole remained 
,. 
32nLes resultats ofticiels," L9lllustration, CXC (January 19, 19'.35), 
67; Naudeau, IIHistoire et morale du pleb1scite sarrois," L'lllustration, 
CXC (January 26, 1935), 950 
3'.3Marcus, French Socialism. !!! ~ Crisis Years, pp., 98-99. 
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moderateo'.34 
The expected. rush of' refugees from the Saar did not materializeo 
Expecting some 40,000 France received. only abQut one-tenth .of ~t number 
in the first dayso In prepa.N.tion for the exodus, France closed the Saar 
border on Januaey 13 and channelled traf:tio toward check points at Forbach 
tor p:rocessingo The French oGnsulate in Saarbruecken began issuing visas 
~o anti-Nazis on the fifteenth of Janua.J."1, street..oar tares were reduced. 
to help the impovef'ished, and the FNnoh Red Cross made provisions for 
:rood and shelter" As days passed, the tlow of refugees increased, but 
the number reached only 10,000 by February 20. The French Government 
took the position that Saarlanders were st.ill und~r League authority and 
aooordingl:, asked that the League assist with the financial burdeno The 
Committee ot Three agreed and advanced 20,000 Sides francs tor ad-
ministrative purposeso In the following :,ear the League wc:Nld finance 
and establish a Saarlandei settlement in Paraguay.JS 
On the sixteenth or Januaey, 193.5, the Franco-Saar OU.atoms Union 
endede Anticipating the austerity which they believed would result. from 
rattachement, the Sa.arlanders had been laying in French supplies, parti-
cularly foodstuffs and il"On ore, for the previous three weeks. Saar 
tariffs were imposed on French imports on the eighteenth, thus breaking 
the economic tiee At the same time an agreement was signed at Naples 
which transferred mines, railroads and other French properties .as~ as 
the economic administration of the Territory to Germanye Included in 
this agreement were provisions concerning private insurance policies and 
'.3~ew ~ ;r:t.mes, January 20, 1935, seco IV, Po 2e 
35rud., January 14, 1935, Pe 3, January 16, 1935, P• 13, January 
17, 1935, Po 15, January 20, 1935, Po 31, and February 21, 1935, Po 9; 
W&mbaugh, §!!£ Plebiscite, PPo '.309,,,3100 
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" social insurance. On January 18, 1935, then, the French left the Saar 
a.f'ter sixteen years of occupat1ono36 
Dnmediately a.f'ter the plebiscite, France had presented a demand to 
the League that the Rhineland demilitarization provisions QI extended to 
the Saarland, vhen the League resolved to transfer the Terr!.toey to 
Oem&ny" by March 1, Laval reiterated this d.and, but the Reich made no __ 
comment other than a statement accepting the transfer dateo A militari-
zed Saar was unacceptable to most French ~pap~•. as well, al)d they at-
tempted to oamoutlage their error in belittling pro.,German sentiment in 
the Terri toey by voicing their opposition to new Franco-German ne .. 
gotiations11 Germ.any must first adhere to an E&stem tocarno and guarani. 
tee the independence ot Austfia; only then might agreements b reached 
on demilitanzat:lon and equality ot armaments. By March, however, other 
outsta.nding questions concerning the completed transfer were entirely 
subject to Hitl ~0s endorsement.)? 
The French had appaNntly bec()llle too dependent on Hitler's good w.l.llo 
Their Oovernnent made the necessary agree111ents w1 th Oemany for the trans .. 
fer ot the 'l'erritoey, and in return Laval gained his extension of de-
militarization to the Saaro Laval's conciliation had, i~ tact, reduced 
the Saar question to nothing; it was ~s gift~ the Third Reich. To be 
sure, Laval's negotiations and agreements with Italy and the Soviet tJni.on 
would provide France with the illusion of securit'; she was no longer 
isolated as she had been at the end of 19330 But the Franco-German 
problem and the question of Fllropean peace had not been,solved. Two 
36New ~es, January 17, 1935, PPo 8, 15, and January 19, 1935, 
' Po 5o 
37Ibid., January 18, 1935, PPo 1, 2, January 20, 1935, seco IV, Pe 
2. 
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months after the Saar plebis~i te, Hitler a~ed .. Gf!trm.an re&Hl8lllent and 
by that measure abrogated the military clauses ot the Treaty of 
. .Ve:rsa.illes o .'.38 
. ~ . ...:....-· 
CHAPI'ER V 
CONCLUSION '.: 
: ' 
. I 
I 
' 
.. .I 
. . . ,· . 
The unification ot all Germans under the Third Reioh was one ot 
, ,! •· ' ,, a J ,, ' I •• 
/ ' . ;,, , . 
Hitler's cardinal goals, and he wasted no,,1time in pursuit of hi~ :du,· 
! . 
Austria was one of the areas which ear17·'.mgaged ~s attention." The ~aar 
/ . 
Basin was another and bec&llle the :pivotal ·.a:na ot Na.mi deatgns 1:i::i.19:34-
. ' . 
' .. 
19:35, P'rance had been P,ve)l a tttte•~rear period~ controlwith which 
to ovet'Come German influence in ihe saarland., 79t taU•d. to u1,;1Uze her 
. . . 
obvious political, economic, and o,4.tural resources tor.~- ~rpose~ 
I I 
Although the stratep.o value of~• Territory was reo~gnlzed bY' the 
French, their govefflllent •••ed ~nterested only in the imrq.ediate economic 
i . 
; 
. . 
advantages to be gained. As a ,Neult, Hitler's propaganda eampaign was 
. ' ' 
. . 
unchallenged by the rrenoh !lO,'emment, and the Nazi ideolo.a alone was 
; 
pemitted to impress the saarlanders. The impact ot nationaU• and the 
J 
. .. 
vigor of National Social.is~ were, in tact, HitJ.er•s ~nly w.a.pcu,,, Tb• 
more undesirable consequerices of 'his policies, including th._peNeoUti~n· 
I '. 
ot religious groups ~ ,the supp~ssion of labor, wel"e not··e!!lP~siized··1n 
the Saar except by a relatively few renegade.fanatics ~Qh as ~ol. 
The sensitivity, c,f th., p~edominantly Catholic and.p~letla.n~.saar -~ 
therefore spared anq''wb.at should have 'been the pri.maey argu.ment ta.gaini;;t . 
. · .: .. . r· . . , _ .. t _· ·, •• ·• • . • • ... 
joining the Reich t>ias not a major factor in the N$\tlts of·the plebiscite. 
. . / . . . 
still, the Saar t,ivored only Germany, not Hitler. It opposed the League 
. . 
.,. 
administration is. a f~reign oppressor and a French. tool,·· and. castigated 
·( 
ha.nee as a co.lonial power • 
. ;' 
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The cr.1 t:lcal stage in the Saar came in Deoe111ber, 1934., . Up to that 
tim.e, a status s.,us;t settlement enjoyed considerable support., But the 
f:i.nal withdrawal. 0£ French int.erest in the Saar land through the Rome 
agreement, and the advocacy of rattachement 'by the Catbolio ChurQh pre-
cluded any other plebiscite decision. The Nazis .. were then · able to gain 
their first major victory, a prelude to their future demands tor Austria., 
Czechoslovakia, and Poland. 
Though a minor point in 1t,elt, the Saar plebiscite was ~n UJ,ustri-
ous v.1ctory for the League, tooo The Plebiscite. Comnd.,ss1on provid.ed a 
secure and. valid vote under extremely difficult condi~ons, and the 
:l.ntemational foroe oaiol"ied out its duties in the Sa.arland im~mally 
' 
and with good effect,, League administration of the Saar was clouded, how-
ever, by the discontent of the Saarlanders with the Governing. Commission. 
In addition, French incor:aistenoy in its Saar policy did not contribute 
to Jliropean peace, and no lasting Franco.German agreell'le:n,t res,;al.ted frc.,m 
,' : 
the pleb:isoiteo More accurately, the.adminiatrative success of the plebi-
scite resulted :f':rom F~enoh unconcern and oonoil1at1on wh.1.ch lett turthe.r 
German pressure unnecessary. 
I)lr!ng the nineteen twenties and early thirties, ,various F~nch.foreign 
ministers had hoped that :rattachement would lead to a P)'an~o ... Qe.nrJ."-:r,. re~ 
co:nciliationo An agreement with the Weimar Republic seemed feasible and 
even desirable, but the advent of Hitler comp011nde<:l t,he COlllplexityof the 
situation,, Even in 19'.33, a Saar agreement, perhaps in conjunction with 
an ef'fecti;ve disarmament scheme, still appeared to offer a. valuable basis 
for European peaceo Bat Barthou's inability and later unwillingness to 
bargain with Hitler in 19'.34 destroyed. this opportunity. Instead of pro ... 
:m.oting a compromise settlement, the French minister pursued the policy of 
encircling Germany through bilateral treaties; a policy which tu:rthe!" 
aggravated Fra.mo-Gema.n relations. The murder of Ba.rthou bro1.igh't- an end 
to these machinations and opened. a new era of nego.tia ti<ms and concilia .. 
tion. '.!Laval sough:t only to ri.d France of' the Saa.:r .thorn in the erroneous 
belief that ratta.chement would be an effect.ive m~ns to a £1:1.ture ~o!Jt• 
ment2. He apparently railed to recognize the anti-French att,:i.tu.de inherent 
in National Socialism, and accordingly rei'used. to utilize the Saar struggle 
in opposi.:ng Nazi designs. La.val thus wasted the last chance for> France 
to gain concessions from rattachemu~nt. 
' The overwhelming pro-German vote in the Saar pointed up the un-
popuJ . .arity o.f France and the I-Jeagu.e at the same time that it vindicated 
Nazi nationalisti.c claims.. ?.~his rebuff' reverbera:t.ed through Eu.rope and 
gave rise to the be.l.ief that I-Pranch policies were not only mistaken 'b11t 
impotent,. :irurther, Hi'tler ,1a.s given a measut"e of eont'ide:n.ce by the plebi-
sc~,t.e•s results and appeared. to be emboldened in his pursuit o:f other 
pl,a.:ns, speoif'icall.y in regard. t..o P..ustm.a and .rearmament. In C'ie~ma.n;y, he 
proclaimed the Saar solution to be a great vieto:ry for the Thi:t:"d Jteich 
and. one which Nmoved the first sha.okle or. Versailles. Yet thb v:lcto17 
and the optimism to which it gave ri.se nsulted af.ter J:H:tl.er had. first. 
doubted the Nazi eff'ect on the completely Gemanif.:ed Saa.rland .. 
Finally, the inconsistency of' the foreign policy of France undermined 
her ~!.~_!r~.. .Paul ... Boncour in his moderation desired a. r~Pl:2:t"O~~!!F wi.th 
Germaey and was willing to use the Sa.ar question for this purpose .. The 
conservative change under Barthou, his 'ffhard line'' of insuring a plebi-
scite, and his demand for definite German guarantees, negated any f a:vor-
able effects from the earlier policy. Further, Barthou was engaged in re-
pairing.French defenses and shoring up the alliance system in the belief 
tha.t sec1:_r!~ could best be protected through force or the threat of 
force. .But taval' s ~lioy now supervened to destroy the gains of Barthou., 
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ta.val' s conciliatory etf o:rt was reminiscent of the .. Bria.,nd ... stresemann 
dialogue of the Weimar era 'but was :inco~ous in the era of the Third 
Reieh. The 193.5. pl,ebiscite was the end product ct Laval•s tutile etf'ort 
to produce a F:ranco-Oeman £4pprochement and thereby provide tor the . 
peaee o.t' Ea:rope: its·on1.y :result was to lower French prestige and ~n-
crease Masi oonfi.d•ce. Thus, during Hitler's first two years, Fre?J.Oh 
foreign policy had nl.ied. u.pon three separate methods so tha:t no one plan 
was really tested to?O its effectiveness in provi.ding .sf!!urit4.· 
The tailurie ot France i.n the Saa.rland bet,ween 1.933 and 19:35 was on4' 
one phase in the continuing Franco-German oonflict, but untc:ritunately be-
came the pattern tor later F.ranco-Germa.n relati.ons.1 
lFor a. we11 .... reasoned and interesting argmnent that the tragedy of tb.e 
years 1936..;1939 came abcmt a.s the natural :result of the 1933-1936 events, 
see Cameronts Prologue !2. Appeaseente 
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